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INTRODUCTION
The season for talk of leaving the Constitution behind, while we grit
our teeth and do what must be done in times of grave peril-the season for
talk of saving the Constitution from the distortions wrought by sheer
necessity, while we save ourselves from the dangers of genuine fidelity to
the Constitution-is upon us. Such talk, the staple of commentary on the
survival of constitutional democracies in wartime and other similarly trying
periods, was to be expected in the wake of September 11.
It was once an unspeakable thought that our Constitution should have
lacunae-temporal discontinuities within which nation-saving steps would
be taken by those in power, blessed not by the nation's founding document
but by the brute necessities of survival.' But the unspeakable became more
readily articulable when the inimitable pen of Robert H. Jackson gave word
to the thought in his canonical dissent from the Supreme Court's justly
infamous Korematsu decision,2 proclaiming that the great harm to liberty
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1. In Exparte Milligan, Justice Davis put the point this way:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and
in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
despotism ....
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
2. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu held that exclusion of all
persons of Japanese ancestry from a designated "Military Area" was constitutional. Ex parte
Endo, decided on the same day, held that the War Relocation Authority was without lawful power
to detain concededly loyal and law-abiding United States citizens, some 61,000 of whom (of
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and equality done by the military expulsion of Japanese Americans from
their homes and communities was dwarfed by the still greater harm done by
bending the Constitution into a form that could rationalize that course of
action.3 Better by far, Jackson darkly suggested, would have been a strategy
whereby the military would have been left free to do what the law of
necessity called for, while the courts washed their hands of the affair and
did nothing to create a precedent by holding the military's actions to be
constitutional.4
Although Justice Jackson failed to work out a scheme that could
actually achieve both of those results, there has been no dearth of
commentators seeking to close the Jackson gap by dreaming up elaborate
superstructures of doctrine and meta-doctrine that could essentially square
the circle that the Justice left unsquared.5 By no means the first of these
commentators but by far the most ambitious has been, not surprisingly,
Bruce Ackerman, who brings to the task his special gift for provokery.6 His
work, even (perhaps especially) for the unpersuaded reader, persists in
memory-reorients resistant thought and recasts problems, working
materials, even expectations. 7 The Emergency Constitution8 is no exception.
It is brave. Ackerman proposes that we assume the trauma of September 11
will recur often, and that we face up to the task of thinking through the
work constitutional law must do given this assumption. 9 It is startling.
Japanese ancestry) were at that point confined in internment camps, as most of them had been for
about two years. 323 U.S. 283, 296 n.19 (1944).
3. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
4. See id. at 247-48.
5. For leading recent discussions (including references to the larger literature), see Oren
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?,
112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil
Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004); and Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?:
Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REv. 273.
6. A word we created for the occasion, to be sure, but one we think is more aptly active than
"provocation."
7. One of us has on occasion underestimated the transformative undercurrent of the
distinctively Ackermanic take on the enduring puzzle of constitutional upheaval and discontinuity,
treating Bruce Ackerman's powerful and illuminating (if still problematic) notion of
"constitutional moments" with too little generosity to see what it has to teach even the
unconverted. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1225, 1301-03
(1995). The other one of us has suggested that some of Professor Ackerman's arguments might
supply a defense for cannibalism. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Persistence of Classical Style, 131
U. PA. L. REv. 663, 768 (1983).
8. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
9. Some might think it insensitive-while the memorial for September 11 is still being
planned, while the inquiries into why America was caught so unprepared that day are still being
pondered, and while the grief of those who lost the most in the attacks remains almost as fresh as
yesterday-to brush past that tragedy quite so quickly, locating it on history's map as but one of
what we claim to know will be a long series of similar events, each terrible in its psychic toll but
none so awful as to crush the nation. It is part of Professor Ackerman's flinty appeal as a
hardheaded realist that he is undeterred by such considerations. What's done is done, he tells us;
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Ackerman believes that ordinary constitutional law in all its elaborateness
(mostly "fog,"' 0 he seems to think) should overtly give way in states of
emergency like that occasioned by September 11. It is inventive. Ackerman
proposes that in states of emergency a constitution of his own devising
should instead apply.
In the United States, he thinks, this constitution would likely take the
form of a framework statute. Basic procedures are clearly outlined. Each
particular state of emergency would require congressional authorization;
such authorizations would be subject to time limits and provisions requiring
escalating supermajorities for renewals. Congress would be able, in a
structured way, to obtain pertinent information developed by executive
officials.
But it is not always easy to grasp more than the vaguest contours of
Ackerman's scheme. For example, the content of the powers granted to
executive officials by a declaration of emergency seems to be left to
improvisation by unspecified institutions and at unspecified times (whether
by Congress ex ante, or by Congress at the time of the emergency's
invocation, or by the emergency-invoking Executive at that time).
Ackerman often talks as though authority to engage in wide-scale
preventive detention will be the principal power conferred. I I On this
assumption, individuals would be afforded a limited set of procedural and
substantive rights, including time limits on detention, a ban on torture, and
a right to compensation for those ultimately determined to have been
wrongly incarcerated. But at other points, especially in This Is Not a War, 2
Ackerman suggests that any of a seemingly open-ended list of
counterterrorism measures might come into play.13 As a result, this Essay at
times must proceed in the alternative, yielding a regrettable
cumbersomeness that may make it especially helpful to identify at the
outset the broad themes we pursue in the pages that follow.
we'd best get on with the stern work of constitutional engineering to prepare ourselves for more,
much more, of the same or worse. We do not pretend to know how sound that pessimistic
prediction is. Serious terrorist attacks take place with disturbing regularity around the world-if,
at this writing, not yet repeatedly within the United States. In the very nature of the case, only
optimistic predictions about such matters can ever be falsified--except, of course, for those
pessimistic predictions that are foolhardy enough to set a date certain for their forebodings to
materialize. (Think of how many "Repent, for the world ends on June 24!" signs must be recycled
annually!) For the sake of argument, however, we are prepared to accept Ackerman's geopolitical
projections so that we might focus attention on the constitutional response he prescribes.
10. E.g., Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1042.
11. See, e.g., id. at 1033, 1037, 1062.
12. Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004).
13. See id. at 1889-91. He says almost nothing about what other rights, if any, would be
recognized in connection with such non-detention-related measures, and nothing about the
foundation, theoretical or practical, on which the definition of those other "emergency rights"
might rest. And there are, as we will see, substantial additional ambiguities as well.
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Our first concern is pragmatic: Is Ackerman's "emergency
constitution" a remotely plausible way to organize government action? To
the extent that the scheme sets itself up outside ordinary constitutional
law-as freestanding-it warrants a particularly searching examination to
test for unexpected implications or byproducts, including any that may be
so troubling as to bring the entire enterprise into doubt. Based on that
examination, we believe the grounds are overwhelming for rejecting the
Ackerman proposal as anything beyond an interesting thought
experiment-a useful reminder of the reasons for not following the sirens
that beckon us in times of crisis to set the Constitution aside and to live by
another code altogether.
Second, we worry about the enormity of what proposals like
Ackerman's would have us give up in order to create bracketed times and
spaces within which we might do terrible things without thereby becoming
terrible people. Ackerman, it often appears, genuinely means to jettison
much of ordinary constitutional law during the brightly demarked periods
within which his emergency constitution is in force. It therefore becomes
important to evaluate how the propositions of constitutional law that are
retained by-or, more properly, incorporated by reference in-the
Ackerman emergency constitution will work in their new context. Beyond
that, there is the large question of what Ackerman is willing to abandon,
however temporarily: a complex body of conceptualizations, arguments,
and points of departure regarding the content and limits of individual
rights-one that presents the law of the American Constitution as a system,
rather than simply as a pile of rules from which some might be drawn and
others discarded as suits the fancy of the alternative constitution-builder. Is
this imposing resource, the product of much conflict and hard thinking,
really so fragile or so useless in the emergency contexts that Ackerman
addresses that it is better to discard it for the time being than to work within
its ambit?
Third, we call attention to the role of memory--or rather, of amnesia.
Professor Ackerman would treat the state of emergency as discontinuous
from and fundamentally outside of ordinary constitutional law and,
therefore, as largely irrelevant, except for cleanup matters, to constitutional
law after the emergency ceases. To disarm Justice Jackson's loaded pistol, 14
waiting for the tyrant who would but fire it, one must essentially erase it
from memory-or at least drain it of virtually all its power as precedent,
reducing its traces to mere wisps left over from the fog of war. But this
constitutional amnesia is likely to be at least as superficial as it is alluring.
14. "The principle... lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that
can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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At its best, such contrived forgetting would merely relegate awareness of
previously rationalized abuse to a hard-to-address constitutional
subconscious. It is in any case no boon: The memory of how we once
rationalized what we later take to be a wrong, sometimes a great and
terrible wrong, contributes to constitutional law no less than does the
memory of how we have in the past kept our affirmative commitments to
do right.
The first Part of this Essay sketches some of the difficulties that seem to
us prominent on the face of what Professor Ackerman proposes. But we do
not mean to dwell too long on matters of detail: It is the general line of
Ackerman's thought that we mean to pursue and, in the end, to criticize.
The second and third Parts of this Essay-in which we begin to re-explore
our own thinking "after Ackerman," and to re-view the constitutional
context-accordingly attempt to take the process of provokery a step or two
further. We locate the elements of ordinary constitutional law that Professor
Ackerman retains (however implicitly) in his proposal and mark an
important question of constitutional reform that he does not discuss. In the
process, we also identify what is, at bottom, an important problem of
distributive justice created by his proposal. Finally, we emphasize the
density of ordinary constitutional law. Its accumulated lines of thought and
argument are indeed tantamount-however familiar the metaphor-to the
threads of a complex tapestry. We pick out certain of these threads and
consider what their patterns suggest about what it is possible to expect-to
weave-from constitutional law even in the course of emergencies.
In the process of these explorations, we shift our focus away from
Professor Ackerman's specific proposals, although we draw on resources
that reflecting on those proposals brings to mind. We propose to
complement more than criticize. To that end, we describe judicial responses
within constitutional law-in the United States and abroad. Professor
Ackerman's analysis, however dialectically, alerts us to much that we had
not previously recognized. India's response to constitutional emergency in
the 1970s is especially illuminating. Utterly familiar Cold War domestic
security cases also disclose considerable judicial ingenuity in framing
constitutional inquiries into governmental actions in periods of great peril.
This is so not because our Supreme Court always reached conclusions in
the Cold War era with which we agree. Rather, it is because the Court's
struggles, across close to twenty years, led the Justices to develop useful
ways of structuring disagreement-among themselves, within government,
and within the country at large-in the very process of defining rights and
limits to rights.
Do we think Ackerman's proposal is unconstitutional within the terms
of ordinary constitutional law? In an important sense, the question answers
itself. Of course we do: Unless the Ackerman Constitution unleashed
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government to take steps permissible within its terms that Ackerman sees as
vital for the nation's security but that- the normal Constitution would
condemn, the Ackerman Constitution would purchase nothing for the nation
that its current Constitution, sans Ackerman, did not already provide. Even
at the narrowest technical level, take the version of Ackerman's proposal
that emphasizes preventive detention of individuals who could not lawfully
be held in custody under normal constitutional standards (even considering
the flexibility of the Fourth Amendment's crucial terms): The closest one
could come to giving the Ackerman Constitution a "normal" constitutional
seal of approval would be to shoehorn it into the form of a complex,
conditional, and partial suspension of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Article I, Section 9. Ackerman does provide for congressional action-the
declaration of emergency-as the immediate precondition to the suspension
of habeas on which his scheme hinges, and as a post hoc ratification of any
very short-term presidential action tantamount to suspension. But we must
also suppose that whatever events qualify as sufficient to trigger the
Ackerman emergency constitution constitute "Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion" in which "the public Safety may require" the suspension of
habeas for unlawful detention or for detention under unlawful conditions. 5
The jurisprudence of "rebellion or invasion" is not so well-developed,
however, that one can say with any certainty that anything less than a
"war," in the ordinary constitutional sense of that term (and the very sense
that Professor Ackerman is determined to argue is inapplicable to the
attacks of September 11 and our military responses to those attacks), could
suffice to permit a suspension of habeas by Congress.16
Moreover, Ackerman necessarily supposes that, within the emergency
period, government actions will occur that would ordinarily be
unconstitutional-a supposition that is unaffected by the lawfulness of the
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
16. Perhaps the determination of precisely when an "invasion" becomes an act of "war"
against the United States such that a full-scale military response involves an exercise of the
warmaking power is, within broad boundaries, nonjusticiably political. At the very least, however,
there is tension between Professor Ackerman's desire to deny that the military response of the
United States to al Qaeda's attack upon our nation has involved us in a "war," and the need to
squeeze the entire bulk of his "emergency constitution" within the relatively confining channel
defined by the notion of an "invasion." See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1871-73. We do not share
Professor Ackerman's conviction that the military conflict being waged by the government
against al Qaeda and cognate groups is less than "war" in the constitutional sense simply because
the entities that are our adversaries in the current conflict are supranational in nature and, rather
than being merely "state-sponsored," have gone so far as to take over a state (Afghanistan,
through the Taliban). Indeed, we suspect that a mindset that could not fathom profound threats to
the nation coming from sources other than nation-states and their armies may have handicapped
efforts to respond effectively to al Qaeda in the months leading up to September 11. For especially
elegant discussion of the matter, see PHILIP BOBBITr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE,
AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 819-23 (2002). Our problem is not with calling this war a "war"
but with calling it a "war against terrorism"-a label so amorphous and all-encompassing that,
like the "war on crime" or the "war against evil," it can never be ended, much less won.
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suspension of habeas corpus for testing the legality of those actions insofar
as they result in anyone's detention. Ackerman provides for some remedies
as alternatives to the writ he has temporarily erased-judicial hearings,
compensation schemes, potential punitive damages suits. Whether these
arrangements are sufficient even from a strictly remedial perspective to
meet the demands of ordinary constitutional law depends, of course, on the
details. But those details are left to the imagination-as are the answers to
additional questions of importance to the remedial inquiry. For example,
would the usual injunctive or declaratory actions be available even if
habeas corpus writs were not? If the answer is yes, then how would the
ordinary purposes of suspending habeas (so as to free the government from
the encumbrances of having to pause in mid-battle to persuade a judge of
the legitimacy of its course) be advanced? If the answer is no, then in what
sense would the underlying substantive rights, which are still secured by the
Constitution and which no mere statute could entirely obliterate, not have
been utterly destroyed? In any event, the outlines of how constitutional
law should approach questions of court-closing are well-known. The
brooding omnipresence is Henry Hart. 17 What to make of the scheme as a
whole-how to assess the seriousness of its numerous departures from the
Constitution as normally understood-must, for now at least, be described
as a question shrouded in mystery.
Are we simply stating a preference for the courts over Congress-for
adjudication over legislation-as the principal governmental guardian of
individual rights? Hardly. No less than Professor Ackerman and in some
ways perhaps more, we recognize a crucial role for Congress-a
constitutionally granted role-in limiting executive unilateralism. Nor are
we any less committed than is Professor Ackerman to the proposition that
constitutional law includes not only judicial understandings of
constitutional texts, but also congressional, presidential, and popular
understandings-however complicated the paths along which and the
modes by which those understandings combine. We do discuss the work of
courts at length. But the issue to be addressed here is not, or at least not
exclusively and perhaps not even primarily, courts and their limits. The
issue, rather, is whether constitutional law, as we experience it (make it,
interpret it, teach it, deploy it) in all its ordinary complexity, should in
important respects be set to the side and suspended during certain defined
episodes that will punctuate our lives as we engage in the grave business of
fighting terrorism.
17. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 345-61, 1289-93 (5th ed. 2003). Ackerman's proposal also
raises constitutional questions insofar as the framework statute fixes supermajority voting rules
for Congress. See infra note 139.
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I. PROFESSOR ACKERMAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION
Bruce Ackerman proposes that we set aside ordinary constitutional law
in the event that government finds itself confronting future terrorist attacks
like those of September 11, 2001. He thinks we would be better off
proceeding instead within the framework of a purpose-built "emergency
constitution." He sketches a sequence of institutional arrangements in terms
sufficiently general to be adapted and adopted not only in the United States
but in other representative democracies as well:
Emergencies can be declared only after an actual attack; they can
be continued for short intervals only by increasing supermajorities
in the legislature and only after minority parties obtain privileged
opportunities to inform themselves as to the real-world operation of
the emergency regime and to publicize the facts as they see fit; and
the scope of emergency powers is limited to the needs for relief and
prevention that justify them in the first place. 18
Ackerman believes that the paradigmatic government response to a
terrorist attack will be some scheme of mass arrest, confinement, and
interrogation. Accordingly, he adds to his constitution a requirement that,
after their release, the government pay "financial compensation to all
innocents who have been swept into preventive detention."' 19 Government
officials would be obliged to bring detainees "expeditiously" before
judges-although the detainees would not initially be permitted to
challenge the government's stated grounds for detention.20 "Decency, not
innocence," would be the "overriding concern"-"Do not torture the
detainees."2' Detainees also would be entitled to "[r]egular visits by
counsel., 22 Ultimately, after forty-five or sixty days, some sort of
evidentiary hearing would become a necessary precondition for further
confinement. z3 Once released, detainees could not be immediately
reconfined.24
Taken together, these accumulated procedures and constraints are
meant "to present a picture of the 'state of emergency' as a carefully limited
regime, tolerated only as a regrettable necessity, and always on the path
toward termination. ' '25 This "picture," Ackerman seems to suppose, should
remain apt even if emergency powers encompass measures-surveillance
18. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1060-61.
19. Id. at 1062.
20. Id. at 1070-71.
21. Id. at 1071.
22. Id. at 1073.
23. Id. at 1070-71.
24. Id. at 1074.
25. Id. at 1076.
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programs, say--quite different from campaigns of preventive detention and
questioning. Is this what we see? Or just an uneasy jumble?
A. Demonstrative Constitutionalism
For Bruce Ackerman, what we need to picture, to bring into focus, is
the idea of "necessity." Necessity is, it seems, first of all something like an
impulse or motive propelling government action. "When a terrorist attack
places the state's effective sovereignty in doubt, government must act
visibly and decisively to demonstrate to its terrorized citizens that the
breach was only temporary, and that it is taking aggressive action to contain
the crisis and to deal with the prospect of its recurrence. 26 But this
proposition, Ackerman recognizes, is opaque: Why must government act?
Why must action be visible and decisive? Terrorist attacks like those of
September 11 do not, he thinks, directly threaten the survival of
government-such attacks are too limited in scope to pose the "existential"
risk of utter obliteration or disintegration.27 In this, we think he is surely
right. There exists a category of terrorist attacks, which we are prepared
with Ackerman to suppose will occur with greater frequency on American
soil in this century than in the century past, that do not challenge our
survival as a nation in the way that the Civil War, World War II, and certain
moments in the Cold War, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, no doubt did.
Yet a successful terrorist attack is, all the same, politically perilous-far
more perilous than either a natural disaster of comparable scale, or an
economically motivated criminal conspiracy with the usual sordid mix of
corruption, drug dealing, witness tampering, urban violence, and even
murder-because such an attack is profoundly destabilizing and insulting, a
"blatant assault on... sovereign authority." 28 The terrorist attack
dramatically and tragically calls into question the claim of government to
maintain public safety, at least temporarily "shattering ... the ordinary
,,29
citizen's confidence in the government's capacity.
Ackerman's language calls to mind the metaphor of the duel.
Government must respond in order to afford "reassurance," "demonstrate"
that the insult rests on a false premise in order to "demonstrate" the true
depths of "the government's general capacity," restore "the ordinary
citizen's confidence," and therefore also restore "sovereignty. 3 ° Shock
begets awe: "The only way to meet this challenge is for the government to
demonstrate to its terrified citizens that it is taking steps to act decisively
26. Id. at 1037 (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 1039.
28. Id. at 1036.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1036-37.
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against the blatant assault on its sovereign authority." 31 Hence the "dragnet"
and other strong responses: Government acts first and foremost to
"demonstrate" its power to protect.
Professor Ackerman's picture sketches a disturbing to-and-fro of insult
and response, terrorist mass murder and government mass incarceration. Its
depiction of government action juxtaposes Franz Kafka and Joanne
Freeman-evokes both the penal colonies and punitive expressionism of
the twentieth century and the calligraphies of republican honor and
democratic order of two centuries earlier. And Ackerman is rightly uneasy
about what he puts before us as his distinctive mode of response. But he
thinks that mode is needed because repeated terrorist attacks are inevitable.
"The attack of September 11 is the prototype for many events that will litter
the twenty-first century., 33 All we can do-or at least the only thing that
constitutional theory can try to do-is provide a form for organizing
government's equally inevitable responses. Our task as mature
constitutionalists, according to Ackerman, is to organize those responses in
a manner calculated to minimize the harms that our own government does
to us in the process of reassuring us-shades of Alexander Haig-that it is
"in control here.,
34
Damage control of the sort that reassures a panic-prone public,
Ackerman suggests, requires attention to three overlapping dangers. There
is, most obviously, the risk of a "downward cycle": "After each successful
attack, politicians will come up with repressive laws and promise greater
security-only to find that a different terrorist band manages to strike a few
years later. ' '35 There is the exacerbating risk of demagoguery: "Above all
else, we must prevent politicians from exploiting momentary panic to
impose long-lasting limitations on liberty., 36 And there is, to cap things off,
the risk of honest error on the side of caution: "Unless careful precautions
are taken, emergency measures have a habit of continuing well beyond their
time of necessity., 37
Ackerman's constitutional design responds to this dystopian specter.
Without attempting to specify much in substance about how serious a
terrorist attack need be, or about who precisely might be subjected to
31. Id. at 1036.
32. See JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC (2001); FRANZ KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in THE METAMORPHOSIS AND OTHER
STORIES 53 (Stanley Appelbaum trans., Dover Publications 1996) (1919).
33. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1029.
34. Steven R. Weisman, Bush Flies Back from Texas Set To Take Charge in Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1981, at Al (quoting Secretary of State Alexander Haig's assertion that "I am in
control here in the White House" in the aftermath of the 1981 attempted assassination of President
Reagan).
35. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1029.
36. Id. at 1030.
37. Id.
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preventive detention and under what conditions, or about what the
government's other emergency powers might be, Professor Ackerman
instead emphasizes political process concerns. Most significantly, he would
impose a requirement that legislative authorization of the declaration of
emergency be repeated at regular, short intervals, each time demanding a
larger legislative majority. He means thereby to make the question of
necessity-at least, the threshold question of the existence of a state of
emergency-a matter for legislative deliberation, not executive fiat. To
assure, as far as is possible, that this deliberation is a matter of reason and
not of rush to judgment or of opportunism, he adds his scheme for
bipartisan information-sharing among legislators. In addition, whatever
their other justifications, several of the individual rights Ackerman includes
in his limited substantive outline of the emergency constitution-for
example, the rights to just compensation, counsel, no double jeopardy-
work to counter the moral hazards presented to executive officials by time-
limited authorizations.
Ackerman's system of repeated votes serves several ends. The votes
make possible an operational rather than theoretical resolution of what
counts as an "emergency." They introduce an increasing bias in favor of a
time-limited definition. Most importantly, the votes themselves, whatever
their outcomes, enact a kind of constitutional normalcy. Legislators
participating in the process, simply by participating, acknowledge limits.
B. Some Pragmatic Questions
The scheme that Professor Ackerman outlines immediately raises
questions as to its value: Are its goals the right ones? How likely is the
scheme to advance those goals, as a matter of fact? Neither of these
questions can be resolved definitively.
First: Ackerman's overriding concern-he characterizes it as "the
purpose of a newly fashioned emergency regime"3 8-is the need to offer
public reassurance, calming fears otherwise likely to dominate government
responses to every large-scale terrorist attack. We agree that this concern is
a valid one; indeed, other things being equal, fear and dread are evils in
themselves. Unwarranted worry that the government may not be making us
as secure as claimed-particularly when the truth is more upbeat than our
fears-may lead us to suspicions that can get in the way of progress on
other fronts. If significant enough, such concern can also pressure
government into unwise sacrifices of important constitutional values; even
if undue public anxiety could in no objective sense be deemed harmful, the
very existence of alarm in the public mind is thus in itself a reason for a
38. Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
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constitutional democracy to respond. 39 Accountability and responsiveness
to the public are, after all, defining hallmarks of democracy, and the
government's effectiveness depends in no small part on its perceived
legitimacy. Of particular concern to Professor Ackerman are the restrictions
on personal liberty that a government in search of greater security and fuller
protection is invariably tempted to impose-and that a populace eager for
greater security may be willing to tolerate and may even demand.
Reassuring the public might be the only way to forestall the even greater
and more lasting backlash against civil liberties that Ackerman worries an
unreassured public might irresistibly insist upon.
All of that seems sensible enough, but we have considerable doubt that
the objective of enhanced public reassurance-even as a means to the end
of holding the temptation to sacrifice rights at bay-is defensible as the
only, or even the primary, goal of an emergency regime. There is, to begin
with, the matter of objectively justified public worry. The lack of
reassurance might, after all, reflect the lack of any sufficient ground for
feeling reassured. Remove the pressure that a justly alarmed electorate can
bring to bear, and the incentives for those who govern to remove the root
causes of alarm will fall below the optimum (that is, farther than they
should). 40 Reducing public hysteria by putting baseless rumors to rest is one
thing; pretending that genuine sources of worry are but idle rumor is quite
another.4' In any event, shouldn't a responsible government be most
concerned with actually preventing and responding effectively to acts of
terrorism, and with actually protecting, trite though it may have come to
sound, the basic freedoms on which our country's very identity is founded?
Shouldn't a responsible government be concerned only secondarily with
convincing the public that government is providing that protection-and,
39. City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), of course, is not to
the contrary. It holds, in the relevant respect, only that irrational alarm seemingly triggered by
antipathy toward a marginalized group-there, a group of mentally disadvantaged residents-
cannot meet the equal protection command of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 442.
40. For suggestive elaboration, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating
Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 628-31 (2003).
41. Professor Ackerman argues that distinguishing between genuine worry and rumor is
simply not possible in this context: "[N]obody has the slightest idea what may happen next."
Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1886 (emphasis omitted). This fatalism may be overstated. The
September 11 commission hearings-including the sworn testimony of the Bush Administration's
National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and of former counterterrorism "czar" Richard
Clarke-suggest, at least at the level of widespread public impression, that government officials
were evaluating the risks of al Qaeda acts of terrorism against civilian targets in the United States
well before 2001, and were debating how to deal with these risks in the face of inevitable
uncertainties about the place and time of any attacks. Whether one thinks Rice or Clarke the more
credible witness to the government's degree of focus pre-September 11 on the al Qaeda threat, it
appears that the government's risk analysis was well enough developed to be properly subject to
reasonable criticism now. Some such risk analysis-careful identification of genuine worries and
appropriate responses-may often be possible in the future as well.
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we would add, not at all concerned with convincing the public that it is
doing more than it is in fact doing?
Professor Ackerman agrees that these are important questions.42 But he
believes that the sort of crisis that we ought to worry about most is the
"double whammy"-a first terrible attack followed after a not-too-long
interval by a second murderous strike. Such a sequence, he thinks, would
utterly undermine public confidence in government.43 The state of
emergency, in this scenario, would be the period of crisis in which
government officials, beginning with their roundups, would urgently try to
catch up with terrorists before we are hit with the "second strike. 44 This is,
to be sure, a dramatic script. But in the almost three years since the
September 11 attacks, we have witnessed (at least outside Israel) either
near-simultaneous attacks in one or more countries, or carefully planned
efforts substantially separated in time resulting in attacks in several
countries, not just the United States. Ackerman's relatively short-term
emergency heroics seem, against this backdrop anyway, rather beside the
point.
Surely many of the most effective responses (in terms of preventing
recurrence of a terrorist attack, even if not in terms of reassuring the
populace that one is doing so) are likely to involve relatively obscure and
colorless changes in ways of processing, translating, and collating
information--changes not nearly dramatic enough to reassure any but the
least emotional among us. 4 5 Professor Ackerman acknowledges that
surveillance and information processing undertaken independently of
preventive detention may matter a great deal. He would treat authority to
engage in such efforts as a grant of power properly-if not necessarily-
included in the framework statute.46 It is not at all clear, however, why such
efforts require a declaration of emergency before being pursued. They
appear to be day-in, day-out efforts, achieving success through persistence
and coordination. We wonder, as a result, whether some of the most
dramatically reassuring measures are likely to have little or nothing to do
42. See id. at 1880.
43. Id. at 1883.
44. Id. at 1883-84.
45. Marketing techniques that appeal to the most primitive fears of a supposedly sophisticated
public are nothing new; the strategy for selling monstrous vehicles that make no net contribution
to anyone's safety (and that might indeed make a net negative contribution, once the additional
protection afforded by a larger vehicle is offset by its decreased maneuverability) is a prime
example. See Malcolm Gladwell, Big and Bad. How the S.U. V. Ran Over Automotive Safety, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 12, 2004, at 28. Several thoughtful suggestions for some genuinely effective
measures may be found in PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY:
WINNING WITHOUT WAR 37-84 (2003). In fairness, it should be added that even so careful a
pragmatist as Professor Heymann acknowledges the legitimacy and utility of at least some steps in
response to terrorist attacks whose principal justification is their tendency to foster public morale
and confidence. See id. at 89-90.
46. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1889-91.
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with actually enhancing the security of the nation and its people. Such
measures might, by creating a false sense of security, actually diminish
salutary sources of pressure on government to do more of the thankless
work of the plain-vanilla variety that needs to get done. The emergency
constitution provides sweeping, short-term executive authority in an effort
to stop terrorists from striking in the immediate aftermath of another attack.
What may be needed is narrow but constant power. The emergency
constitution is broad where it needs to be narrow, and short when it needs to
be long.
It is not altogether obvious, moreover, that Ackerman's emergency
regime would actually increase public reassurance: His assumption that it
would is not grounded in any particular evidence, as far as we can tell
(though neither, admittedly, is the following speculation to the contrary).
Any declaration of emergency may be perceived as a sign of panic or as a
political stunt rather than as a sign that the government has everything
under control. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the first declared
emergency under a regime of the sort Professor Ackerman proposes would
be perceived as especially unnerving-far more so, we would assume, than
the first instance of "Code Red," should that danger signal ever be emitted
by the post-September 11 Department of Homeland Security. However that
may be, it seems likely that after the first few declarations of
emergency47-at least some sequence of which is bound to appear in
hindsight to have been a series of successive false alarms-a widespread
perception may develop that such declarations are mere instances of
government stage-managing just in case things should go wrong,
temporarily releasing law enforcement authorities from shackles they had
long wished to be rid of anyway for reasons having nothing to do with
terrorism.48 Were this the case, such declarations, in and of themselves,
might well accomplish little or nothing. However the details work out, it
seems quite likely that the public would eventually come to view each
succeeding declaration of emergency as a fairly empty political exercise-a
constitutional version of "Code Orange."
Second: Even if political checks make it difficult to sustain an
emergency beyond several months, hundreds of days is not a short time.49
Creating the "emergency" label may make it difficult, moreover, not to
invoke emergency powers in any situation that might remotely qualify.5 °
47. Recall that Ackerman assumes periodic attacks. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1029.
48. See also infra text accompanying notes 95-99 (discussing the USA PATRIOT Act).
49. If terrorist attacks really occur every five years or so, even six-month periods of
emergency (about what Ackerman contemplates) would amount to a very large percentage of total
time-making the state of emergency a rather nonexceptional state.
50. Indeed, Ackerman acknowledges this concern, but never ultimately resolves it. See
Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1041 ("If you build it, they will come-officials will seek to invoke
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Suppose an al Qaeda shopping mall attack kills a dozen people. This would
be a terrible tragedy, but one not even close to September 11 in scale. Yet
imagine politicians trying to explain to the public, and to victims' families,
that this attack was not serious enough to amount to an "emergency," even
though American lives were taken by foreign attack on American soil and
the terrorists who pulled it off are likely still at large. Or imagine that a
suicide attack by seemingly isolated extremists of some sort kills several
thousand people-a genuine emergency in magnitude, no doubt, but
perhaps not justifying emergency powers of detention and the like: After
all, the actual perpetrators are now all dead. Even if most representatives-
and possibly even most members of the public---do not consider either of
these events a true national "emergency," it will be difficult for them to say
so, for fear of looking soft or favoring some victims over others.
Third: It seems far from clear that the probable response of the public to
periodic terrorism is escalating cycles of panic. That this is indeed the likely
response is, of course, the assumption undergirding Ackerman's belief that
public reassurance through an emergency regime is necessary to prevent
eventual worse restrictions on civil liberties.5 Yet the recurring attacks he
predicts might instead have a depressing, even if in some ways salutary,
effect: Such events may normalize terrorist "crises"--that is, cause the
public to adapt to a fairly constant level of terrorist threat and to a
tragically, but no longer shockingly, steady series of actual terrorist
episodes. It is bound to be quite a long time--even if all goes well with
efforts at coalition-building among the principal targets of each new wave
of global terrorism, and even if democratic nation-building proceeds more
smoothly than anyone has grounds at the moment to predict-before we
can feel any confidence that the kind of terrorist assault to which our nation
was first exposed on September 11 will not recur in the foreseeable future.
Such confidence seems unlikely to be warranted until we (and the other
similarly successful economies of the West) have ceased to inspire
resentment, fear, and blinding rage on the part of too many individuals
in too many places. Fanatically, even suicidally, anti-American and
anti-Western ideology-in combination with the resources and aptitude for
deploying the technology and theater of terror-will continue to provide at
least the preconditions for more of the same. We seem more likely to grow
accustomed to terrorist attacks than to sell off larger and larger chunks of
who and what we are in a transparently masked attempt to make those
attacks go away. For, as we will hopefully never have to learn from
firsthand experience, not even a locked-down police state is totally immune
,emergency' powers to handle middling crises, resulting in yet another sad story of unintended
consequences.").
51. For criticism of beliefs like these from a perspective rather different from ours, see Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 40, at 631-34.
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to such attacks; not even a regime of state terror is an ironclad guarantee
against terror from outside the state.
It is a commonplace that September 11 stunned Americans because we
had thought of ourselves, at least since the end of the Cold War, as immune
from external attack on any scale capable of generating nationwide
apprehension. We don't think that way anymore. In many other countries
with recurring, although smaller-scale, terrorism, each attack does not
necessarily induce panic, felt needs for reassurance, and heightened
repression. If the assumption of recurring terrorist attacks holds true, such
stoicism might become the norm here as well. To be sure, the normalization
of terror is a dismal prospect. The silver lining, however, is the possibility
that the wider range of our civil liberties may persist, even under pressure,
past the point that Ackerman fears.52
C. The Danger ofDiscordant Demonstrations
Tableau vivant constitutionalism requires that individual participants
behave in ways consistent with the overall picture that, as a group, they are
supposed to construct. Professor Ackerman would have legislators
communicate deliberateness, bipartisanship, care, and a sense not only of
emergency needs but of a commitment to return to normalcy as soon as
possible. His scheme means to minimize the importance of exaggerated
appeals to fear and to divisive rhetoric. The repeated votes, accompanied by
the bumping-up of the required supermajority as the state of emergency
continues in force, will presumably enable legislators to support needed
emergency measures, while at the same time forcing them to recognize and
grapple with what those measures might cost.53 Repeated votes, by dividing
the emergency into separate periods, each demanding separate assessment,
should thereby encourage legislators to analyze rationally the marginal
costs and benefits of continuing the emergency-an analysis separable from
the question whether the initial declaration was justified.54 The legislative
process Ackerman envisions should prove congenial to even the most
exquisite "good government" sensibility.
Legislative processes, however, are as vulnerable in these
circumstances as elsewhere (indeed, perhaps more so) to the ordinary
vagaries of collective decisionmaking. This dynamic-or at least its most
obviously pernicious manifestations-is a familiar, recurring concern
within constitutional law. It is enough to recall Chief Justice Marshall's
52. We illustrate this possibility within our discussion of the Cold War national security
cases. See infra Section II.B.
53. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1047-49.
54. See id. at 1049.
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analysis in McCulloch v. Maryland,55 then-Justice Stone's footnote in
Carolene Products,5 6 and John Ely's classic, Democracy and Distrust.
5 7
Recent work in behavioral economics, game theory, and associated fields of
psychology-considered, synthesized, and put to use in legal studies most
notably by Cass Sunstein S---expands significantly our awareness of
distorting tendencies too often resident in collective mechanisms like
legislative voting. We do not mean to suggest that these difficulties will
necessarily eventuate. We are not, we think, "deeply distrustful" of
legislative politics. 59 But we do think that adverse possibilities ought to
figure in the reckoning along with also possible positive developments.60
Even the casual reader of Professor Sunstein's writings would worry
about the procedural optimism implicit in Ackerman's regime. Individuals
may suppress their own views in the face of a cascade of opposing views,
either because of a heightened awareness of the incompleteness of the
information available to them, or because individuals are concerned to
protect their reputations. 61 Groups of individuals largely in agreement tend
to adopt extreme versions of their common position, thus heightening
polarization.62 Repeated deliberations may increase this polarization.63
Supermajority requirements may also.64 Perhaps legislators are less affected
by these collective dynamics than other individuals are.65 The bipartisan
information-management rules that Professor Ackerman specifies might
work to increase deliberations cutting across views different enough to
disrupt polarizing convergences.66 Ex ante, of course, we cannot know.
55. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
56. United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.).
57. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
58. We refer chiefly to CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS
Do (2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY]. Other recent relevant work of
Sunstein's includes Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,
112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002); and Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and
Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REv. 1295 (2003).
59. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1891; see also infra Subsection II.A.1 (discussing
constitutional requirements of concurrency).
60. Professor Ackerman reads us as trying to extrapolate from modes of analysis better-suited
to studies of jury behavior and the like. See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1892-93. Cass Sunstein
puts his descriptions of pitfalls of collective decisionmaking to work for purposes of speculative
constitutional theory. See SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 58. We do not mean to
suggest that he would agree with us, only that we are writing here within the same genre (as is
Professor Ackerman, of course). The question is one of possibility and what to make of it. In the
end, Ackerman also acknowledges doubts not too different from ours. Ackerman, supra note 12,
at 1899-902.
61. See SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 58, at 19-22.
62. See id. at 24-27.
63. See id. at 30.
64. See id. at 24.
65. But see id. at 37.
66. See generally id. at 43-45 (stating that heterogeneity is a possible solution to problems of
polarization and the like).
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These worries seem to be especially pertinent because, by and large,
Ackerman avoids the question of what the government's emergency powers
would be. It is also unclear from his discussion how their content would be
defined. The framework statute Ackerman proposes could spell out the
President's emergency powers ex ante and across the board--either
specifically, or by establishing criteria for determining which provisions or
facets of the Constitution are to be suspended under which circumstances.67
Alternatively, the content of emergency powers could depend on ad hoc
judgments, either made and enforced on the spot by state or local "first
responders," or made by way of a congressional decision about what
powers to grant the President in addition to as well as in conjunction with
whatever framework statute might have been enacted. Such an effort at
amendment might occur at the time Congress declared an emergency.
This is a significant ambiguity, because either approach has a major
drawback. On the one hand, specifying the substance of the government's
powers in the framework statute would prevent Congress from tailoring its
response to the particular crisis at hand-and might result in the President
being given powers that go far beyond what is necessary, while perhaps
depriving him of some he needs. On the other hand, not specifying those
powers ahead of time would essentially force Congress to engage in crucial
deliberations regarding the balance between security and constitutional
liberties at exactly the moment when it is least equipped to give the latter
the weight they merit-in the panicked days immediately following a
terrorist attack or a highly credible warning that one is imminent.
It does not seem wrong to worry, therefore, that Ackerman's scheme of
repeated authorizations of states of emergency coupled with increasing
supermajority requirements will with each vote tend to deepen legislative
polarization, and in the course sweep undecided or otherwise independent-
minded legislators into the larger group of sharply like-minded colleagues.
This dynamic may or may not induce shifts sufficient, in any given vote, to
generate a large enough majority in favor of authorizing or reauthorizing a
state of emergency. But if, with Ackerman, we give first priority to
reassuring the public that nothing is amiss, then such distortions in the
legislative process would become problematic whenever they are strong
enough to become visible, not just whenever they affect policy outcomes.
If Professor Ackerman's supermajoritarian escalator results not in
moderation but in a push toward extremes driven by individual concessions
in the face of growing consensus, the result would be very much at odds
67. Presumably a terrorist attack that employs sophisticated computer programming,
advanced "hacking" techniques, and telecommunications equipment to knock out the power grid
for the northeastern United States for a month during the dead of winter, causing thousands to
freeze to death, would call for an array of techniques different from those that might be
appropriate when searching for and attempting to apprehend a would-be suicide bomber.
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with Ackerman's vision. To whatever extent it presents itself, a politics of
extremes, of partisan mobilization, at a minimum disrupts the appearance of
a politics of careful deliberation, of respect for limits, of acknowledgement
of dissent. To this extent, therefore, legislative process will not signal the
persistence of a constitutional ethos.
68
Doubts of the sort that Professor Sunstein's work raises about the
ability of legislative process to assume the burden of responsible
government severely undercut Ackerman's emergency scheme. He relies
almost entirely on the legislative process-rather than on substantive
constitutional protections-as a check on extreme violations of civil
liberties. Ackerman assumes that, in the United States at least, there will
ordinarily be no effective judicial "backstopping," no second look and thus
no second chance to acknowledge constitutional expectations, apropos
legislative determinations to declare (or presumably continue) states of
emergency. 69 He notes the possibility of "egregious cases" justifying
"[j]udicial intervention on the merits"-but without elaboration.70 "[W]e
should rely on the legislature, not the judiciary, to restrain arbitrary
power."71 It is obviously important to consider why he draws this
conclusion.
D. Absent Substantive Ground
Bruce Ackerman places his bet on the legislative process as a check on
executive power in large part, it appears, because he has little confidence
that adjudicative processes will accomplish much in emergency situations.
He acknowledges that "the common law fog" enables judges and
commentators to create "a cloud of suspicion" concerning use of emergency
powers: This fog works to restrict executive officials "[d]uring normal
times. 72 Ackerman notes that the same "fog" also makes it possible for
judges to show "remarkable flexibility" during "a real crisis" even as they
"cover[] their tracks with confusing dicta and occasional restrictive
68. We wonder whether the vagaries of legislative process might also become pertinent in the
course of drafting the framework statute. Professor Ackerman tends to see this crucial legislation
as the product of an oasis of calm. But see Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1899-900. He also,
however, imagines that passage of the framework statute will be an occasion to consider the
relevance, in times of terrorist threats, of other statutes-with the possible result, in his view, that
some such statutes would be limited, or even declared to be irrelevant. Id. at 1887-89. We have
seen, as well, that the grants of authority included in the framework may be multiple, and extend
well beyond preventive detention. Complexities might compound, therefore. There are easy-to-see
risks of inconsistency and ambiguity, but also, we think, an entirely possible breakdown, in the
face of all this difficulty, of the sense of common purpose that Ackerman seems to suppose.
69. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1067.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1066.
72. Id. at 1042.
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holdings"; later, "[a]s the crisis abates," they can gradually "return to their
older habit of casting aspersions on the entire idea of emergency powers. ' 73
Ackerman thinks, however, that this "common law cycle" takes too
long to run. 74 "It supposes a lucky society in which serious emergencies
arise very infrequently-once or twice in a lifetime., 75 If terrorist attacks
occur much more often-even if several years apart-there is a risk that
there will not be enough time for the back half of the cycle to run. We will
be left only with an accumulation of cases displaying "remarkable
flexibility. '76 The consequence would be "the normalization of emergency
conditions-the creation of legal precedents that authorize oppressive
measures without any end."7 7 We would, he worries, find ourselves
possessed of Korematsu, but not its repudiation. 8
Professor Ackerman is conspicuously unimpressed by the impact,
standing alone, of the Constitution's substantive guarantees of individual
rights. These are, he suggests, simply "legalisms":
[T]hey will only function effectively when they are embedded
within a vibrant system of separation of powers. If a political panic
prevails, and there is no institutional check on the President, textual
formulae will not be enough to constrain him in the crunch.
Lawyers are cheap, and the President can always call upon the best
and brightest to stretch the legalisms to cover his case. Though
opponents may energetically protest, the resulting fog will only
serve to perplex the general public-who will be far more
impressed by the President's explanation of the pressing need for
decisive action.79
This must be at least part of the thinking behind Ackerman's
willingness to toss what might to a schoolchild seem like the most basic
rights of all into the black hole of his "emergency constitution." Professor
Ackerman is willing to put substantive human rights, with the exception of
the right not to be tortured, on the chopping block-as subject to
emergency truncation if not entire sacrifice-because, inter alia, he sees
their content as dependent upon the least legitimate branch, the one most
wrapped in clouds of words: the overrated judiciary.
Yet, notwithstanding his hearty legal realism, even Ackerman's own
scheme in fact relies considerably on judges, and on ideas of individual





77.- Id. at 1043.
78. Id. at 1042-43.
79. Id. at 1056.
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expected to oppose a president who ignored a legislative refusal to extend a
state of emergency: "Their opposition to the continuation of the emergency
regime will transform the nature of the political battle. The President can no
longer pretend that he is merely fighting a bunch of minority politicians.,
80
"To dramatize the stakes further, the emergency constitution should
explicitly command the courts to begin considering habeas petitions
immediately upon the legal termination of the emergency."81 Within the
emergency period, judges would supervise treatment of individual detainees
by executive officials, by simultaneously enforcing the right to counsel, the
ban on torture, and the ultimate right to release belonging to detainees as to
whom there is no evidentiary basis for suspicion.82 It is not clear what the
origin of these rights would be in this setting. Ordinary constitutional law?
The framework statute? In either case, with what would judges work, in
these various contexts, if not the "fog" and "legalisms" Ackerman scorns?
He seems to suppose that judges would work with the clear lines fixed
by the state-of-emergency scheme itself: In the case of the scofflaw
president, Professor Ackerman seemingly sees no difficulty whatsoever.
"The court will not be obliged to justify its intervention with complex
legalisms. The issue will be clean and clear: Is the country prepared to
destroy the rule of law and embark on a disastrous adventure that may end
with dictatorship?, 83 What about cases involving individuals caught up in
the dragnet of preventive detention? What if officials argue, after forty-five
days have passed and they are required to come to court, that they are not
sure whether various detainees pose risks? What if they evoke ambiguities
in what they have learned?
Ackerman seems to think that, at least sometimes, the question is one of
judicial confidence. Judges will feel free to think through claims of ongoing
or impending violations of human rights if they do not need, at the same
time, to assess whether a state of emergency truly obtains. He draws this
80. Id. at 1067.
81. Id. at 1068.
82. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently (on January 12, 2004) denied certiorari to review
the Bush Administration's refusal to reveal the names of, and other identifying information
regarding, nearly 1000 non-U.S. citizens it arrested in the United States and detained during the
months following the September 11 attacks. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004); Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Allow Policy of Silence on 9/11 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al. What,
precisely, to make of this shroud of Court-tolerated, if not Court-approved, secrecy is far from
clear. Should it persist, however, one clear implication is that whatever the rights of access to
courts and counsel the Court decrees for detained unlawful "enemy combatants" like Yaser Esam
Hamdi or Jose Padilla (whose cases were argued before the Court just as this Essay went to press),
those rights might be only so much tissue paper for the thousands or tens of thousands of
detainees whose ability to assert them is no greater than the public's ability to discover who and
where they are. Whether the circumstances during a declared state of emergency would be any
more transparent is at best an open question. It is difficult to imagine that they would be.
83. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1068.
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conclusion explicitly in discussing judicial action after a legislative decision
to allow a state of emergency to lapse: "The key point for judges is that
they are off the hook, that the legislature has taken responsibility for
terminating the emergency in a highly public fashion., 84 Ackerman's
discussion of the adjudication of claims of rights abuse during the period of
the emergency itself is more tentative. But sometimes, at least, he seems to
think that judges will be able to derive a sense of what counts as
government abuse by considering whether officials are acting against
individuals, in significant part, simply in order to get around or otherwise
reduce the significance of the time limits.
Real difficulty lurks here. Sharply separating states of emergency from
ordinary constitutional periods requires that the usual resources of
constitutional law-Ackerman's "fog" and "legalisms"-be set to the side,
rendered (or recognized as) unavailable for judicial use. One consequence
is that rights that we ordinarily regard as well-established and richly
elaborated appear, within the emergency context, as only awkwardly
justifiable. Procedure must be pressed hard to serve as a substitute for
substance.85  Thus, Professor Ackerman explains the continuing
applicability of normal free speech -prohibitions against censorship this
way:
Quite simply, if the government can censor, the political opposition
will have a new incentive to vote for the premature termination of
the state of emergency, so as to regain its full rights to
communicate to the public. By expressly insulating political
expression and association from the emergency power, the
constitution not only enhances the vitality of the democratic
process; it encourages the minority to contribute constructively to
the legislative decision terminating the emergency regime.86
We protect free speech in order to help assure continuance of the state
of emergency! Freedom of speech, celebrated in our familiar, anti-
emergency constitution as the "matrix" of all our freedoms,87 becomes the
matrix of all our fears.
84. Id. at 1069.
85. It is enough to mention two principles that Ackerman derives from his scheme for use by
judges-"antinormalization" and "antiobstruction." See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1895. The
first counsels judges to resist use of arguments likely to be of any general relevance beyond the
case at hand; the second suggests to judges that they try to minimize the impact of whatever result
they decree in any particular case. Taken together, the two principles work to reduce adjudications
to a sequence of singularities. His scheme, as Ackerman describes it, is minimalist in the
extreme-aims for decisions with no resonance whatsoever outside the case at hand.
86. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1059.
87. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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Ackerman's discussion of torture is even more baffling. He thinks there
should be an absolute ban, and he criticizes Alan Dershowitz at length for
suggesting otherwise. "[J]udges are no more immune from panic than the
rest of us."'88 They will not be well-positioned to distinguish between cases
in which torture is justifiable and cases in which it is not. But what if the
question is whether a particular executive practice-say, sleep deprivation
or extended exposure to loud, badly played music-is in fact prohibited
"torture"? Judges would need some sense of just why it is that torture is so
profoundly troubling if they are to resolve borderline cases. Within ordinary
constitutional law, they would find much raw material. 89 Within the
Ackerman scheme, however, the torture ban is absolute-but it is also free-
floating. "Just say 'no"' figures as a self-evident truth. There seems to be
nothing more to say. There is no "there" there-or at least not within
Professor Ackerman's own elaboration. 90
E. The Artifice of the Frame
Professor Ackerman's arrangements propose to establish-and depend
entirely upon-sharply drawn lines. In more ways than he acknowledges,
however, such lines are arbitrary. The emergency constitution treats as its
trigger any "actual attack" by terrorists-but not events, apparent to
intelligence agencies although possibly not to the public, that point to
imminent danger of such an attack. 9' The emergency constitution's color
codes span a limited spectrum: Its only codes are green and red. We can
appreciate why: If declaration of a state of emergency is a matter of
legislative discretion, as Ackerman insists it is and must remain, an open-
88. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1072.
89. Starting points include decisions exploring notions of "cruel and unusual punishment,"
e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38 (2002), and "coerced confessions," e.g., Brooks v.
Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (per curiam); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam).
Notably, Francis Lieber had little difficulty identifying moral and pragmatic underpinnings for the
ban on torture that he thought was part of martial law. See Francis Lieber, War Dep't, General
Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field § 1,
paras. 15-16 (Apr. 24, 1863), in RiCHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF
WAR 45, 48 (1983).
90. Professor Ackerman briefly refers to the ban on torture included in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1073 n.99. He notes that a
reservation filed by the United States invokes ordinary constitutional law-its familiar points of
departure (for example, the Eighth Amendment)-to give content to the Covenant provision. See
id. This certainly solves the problem, even as it advertises the emptiness of Ackerman's scheme
otherwise. But why doesn't the framework statute preempt the Covenant? Notably Ackerman also
relies upon the Covenant in a short discussion of racial profiling. Id. at 1075-76. The Covenant
prohibition of discrimination solely on grounds, inter alia, of race, color, and language is
associated, in the United States, with an "understanding" that the prohibition does not reach
distinctions evident only from disproportionate effects. See id. at 1076. Once more, we can see
that complex ordinary constitutional law figures in the background. Does Ackerman also mean for
it to be accessible in this context?
91. Id. at 1059.
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ended description of its trigger creates an obvious risk that the state of
emergency becomes a too-often-available alternative to the ordinary
constitutional order-a real challenge, therefore, to the constitutional ethos.
"A 'clear and present danger' test... generates unacceptable risks of
political manipulation., 92 But however necessary as a matter of
constitutional design, isn't Ackerman's "actual attack" bright line also
artificial? He disagrees:
I would insist on an actual attack, basing this requirement on
the reassurance function that serves as my organizing constitutional
rationale. Something large and dramatic like September 11 shakes
ordinary citizens' confidence in their government's capacity to
discharge its most basic sovereign function: the preservation of law
and order. The best way for government to respond to these fears is
to do something large and dramatic to reassure the populace that
the breach of sovereignty was only temporary and that the state is
taking every plausible step to prevent a second strike. But when an
attack has not occurred, panic-reactions do not seem unmanageable
by standard techniques.9
This is a remarkable passage.
First of all, it flies in the face of common experience. We all know that
the ban on crying fire in a crowded theater applies only if there is no fire,
because in such cases we expect the crowd to panic, and people to be
trampled, for no good reason-whereas the lives saved seem well worth the
identical panic and ensuing injury if a fire is in fact about to engulf the
theater. We all know that memories may be just as powerful motivators as
present events-after the first hurricane, we are much quicker to flee in the
face of even the prospect of a second storm. We all know that "we have
nothing to fear but fear itself." Ackerman's line between actual and
imminent attacks, therefore, may not match up with patterns of public
anxiety. We may worry much-because of what we remember, because of
what we predict-even when Ackerman would bar declarations of
emergency. Why is he so sure that "standard techniques" of reassurance
will work in the circumstances covered by that bar?9 4 (What are these
techniques?) His scheme may substantially underserve its own goal of
reassurance.
Second, the government response to September 11 was not only "large
and dramatic. 95 Professor Ackerman is right that there was a dragnet, and
extended preventive detention-preventive detention of dimensions that
92. Id. at 1060.
93. Id. at 1059-60.
94. See id. at 1060.
95. Id. at 1059.
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will remain unknown unless and until information that the government
insists might aid the terrorists has been forced to the surface.96 But there
was also the rapid enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act,97 a statute held
together more by its acronym than by any logic of actual need, authorizing
a long-term extension and reorganization of government surveillance
efforts, and promising large but (as a result of secrecy, invisibility, and
intricacy) difficult-to-discern consequences. Ackerman's scheme, insofar as
it focuses on preventive detention, would not seem to put us in any better
position than we are now either to criticize or to defend the USA PATRIOT
Act or any of the plethora of measures-federal, state, and local-that have
been taken or begun in the wake of September 11. Why would not
government, within the future that Professor Ackerman envisages, propose
and enact second-, third-, or fourth-generation USA PATRIOT Acts?
Ackerman ultimately addresses this difficulty in his response, arguing
that adoption of the framework statute might be enough to satisfy felt needs
to legislate, and that the process of adoption of the framework would lend
itself to a measured evaluation of a wide array of antiterrorist measures. 98
We have already discussed the pressure such a general review might put on
legislative deliberation. But there is also the question of metrics. How
would Congress think through the comparisons involved? The framework
statute, presumably, would be assembled "at a time of relative calm." 99 It
is difficult to see how consideration of hypothetical cases could resolve
such a complex inquiry. Delegation of responsibility to the executive
branch-often used as a legislative way out in circumstances like these-is
precisely what Professor Ackerman does not want, perhaps even more than
aggressive judicial review, the usual second option seized by stymied
legislators.
Third, there is another, perhaps subtler danger that lurks in Professor
Ackerman's implicit assumption that governmental responses to future
terrorist attacks may be confined to discrete, identifiable collections of
actions, squarely directed at both alleviating the popular anxieties triggered
by such attacks and (one would hope) actually enhancing the safety of
Americans. That barely articulated vision of an insulated and self-
contained-and therefore suitably containable-set of reactions to terrorism
as the proper referent for developing an emergency constitution ignores too
much of what we have learned since September 11 and its aftermath. The
reality of American life in the post-September 11 world reveals something
96. See supra note 82.
97. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 47, and 50 U.S.C.).
98. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1888-89.
99. Id. at 1893.
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very different from a finite and legally bounded panoply of measures that
one might imagine subsumed within the steps authorized under an
Ackerman-like emergency constitution.
One need only consider the multitude of governmental decisions taken,
or at least rationalized, on the basis of the fundamentally altered social,
economic, and political landscape of America after September 11, 2001, to
recognize that responses to terror and emergency defy logical confinement,
and tend to bleed into matters that bear no particular connection to terrorist
threats akin to the one just endured, or indeed to terrorist threats at all.
Thus, after September 11, the most commonplace bureaucratic and policing
decisions involving the prevention of criminal or otherwise dangerous
acts-not only at obvious focal points of precaution like airports but also at
other, seemingly unconnected institutions such as public libraries-
suddenly became, and remain to this day, occasions for invoking and
reliving the September 11 attacks, for intoning the mantra that nothing will
ever be the same again, and for recalling the maxim "better safe than
sorry." 100 The result has been an erosion of civil liberties not only of the
sort implicated in the much-discussed "terrorism cases" of Padilla'°' and
Hamdil02-the sort that would presumably be addressed, if not resolved, by
a proposal like Ackerman's-but of a sort implicated in the everyday
settings of general police procedures 10 3 and criminal prosecutions of
defendants charged with strictly domestic crimes. 104 It may well be the case
that this bleeding of emergency into nonemergency, of extraordinary into
ordinary, is temporary and reversible, and one can inveigh against it, but
there seems little if anything anyone could possibly do to prevent at least its
initial manifestations short of radically transforming the nature of the
human psyche.
100. See, e.g., Cady v. Cook County, No. 02 C 8333, 2003 WL 21360898, at *2, *6-7 (N.D.
I11. June 11, 2003) (upholding the Cook County Law Library's refusal to admit a patron because
he could not produce photo identification including a current home address on grounds that
"especially after 9/11," it is difficult to see how such a "security requirement could be viewed as
outside the mainstream").
101. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004)
(No. 03-1027).
102. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004)
(No. 03-6696).
103. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Humboldt, 59 P.3d 1201,
1205-06 (Nev. 2002) (upholding a requirement that people furnish identification to police during
the course of an investigatory stop conducted only on the basis of suspicion, in part because "we
are at war against enemies who operate with concealed identities and the dangers we face as a
nation are unparalleled"), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 430 (2003) (No. 03-5554).
104. See, e.g., People v. Vaquera, No. B155179, 2003 WL 21135485 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16,
2003) (unpublished decision). Vaquera concerned a gang member on trial for assaulting a girl
with a deadly weapon. The prosecutor concluded her opening argument by invoking "the events
of September 1 th .... [W]e are all justifiably concerned and frightened about ... the acts of
these terrorists, but I'd like to remind you today that not all terrorists are from foreign shores.
Some of them are home-grown terrorists." Id. at * 1 n. I (internal quotation marks omitted).
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To recognize and acknowledge the shifts in mental topography that
follow terrorist attacks, particularly when those attacks are deliberately
designed to achieve maximum penetration into the nation's cultural and
imaginative life, is to realize the danger of designing states of emergency as
though their boundaries could neatly contain the whole or even the great
bulk of social and therefore governmental reaction to the terrorist events
triggering such emergency proclamations. We say the "danger" and not
simply the futility of designing states of emergency on that premise of tidy
containment because we suspect that the allure of the emergency
constitution idea is bound up with the unspoken premise of a Faustian
bargain: We agree not to be too purist in our dedication to civil liberties-to
look the other way for a time and within a defined range of executive
responses while those in positions of military leadership and command do
what they must in order to restore order and provide reassurance that the
holes in our defenses have been identified and largely closed-and, in
return, we can rest assured that the extraordinary and, frankly, scary actions
that our Constitution in its normal form would never tolerate will be
confined to that specific space and time. We thus agree to clear the dense
forest of constitutional constraints that normally get in the way of what
those in executive and particularly military positions agree needs to be done
if we are to restore the sense of normalcy that alone makes the normal
Constitution something we can afford to live with rather than a luxury for
less troubled times. In effect, we agree to make our Constitution something
less than a "constitution for all seasons." The devil assures us that, in all but
the brief season during which we hand him the reins of power subject only
to a radically thinned-out constitution, all will be normal.
As the experience following September 11 makes all too plain, building
an imaginary wall around a state of emergency and proclaiming only a thin
emergency constitution to be operative inside that wall offers no realistic
hope of preventing the ripple effects of any given terrorist attack, and of the
government responses to that attack, from breaking through cracks in that
wall and bleeding into ordinary affairs-into the broad vistas of American
life that bear no real connection to the attack, to the techniques it employed,
or to the risks it represents. So any realistic assessment of what that
constitutional bargain with the devil might be expected to yield had better
not proceed on the wishful premise that whatever zone is covered by the
emergency constitution even begins to define the ways in which our
liberties are likely to be diluted as a result of what the latest attack will have
wrought in the collective consciousness of the nation. And, lest anyone
suppose that accepting an emergency constitution will do no harm in the
realms that lie beyond its defined reach, it should be remembered that the
sense of security that comes with the territory whenever we talk the talk of
emergency measures with self-limiting sunset clauses-a sense of security
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without which the bargain would never have seemed so tempting in the first
place-is the very thing that threatens to lull us into being most forgiving of
government encroachment in the interest of patriotism precisely when the
lessons of history teach us we had best be most on guard.
Fourth, the "actual-attacks-only" approach advocated by Professor
Ackerman, which contributes to the illusion that the space being cleared for
the devil is but a tiny one in the end, may make states of emergency pretty
much beside the point for purposes of actually preventing terrorism.
Ackerman supposes-and we are sadly unable to argue strongly to the
contrary-that the threat of terrorism is likely to be more or less constant,
or at least enduring, for the foreseeable future. The best defense, in addition
to understanding and confronting terrorism's root causes abroad, may
therefore be constant vigilance. The principal security objective ought to be
preventing the next attack, not responding to previous ones. But the
sacrifices of rights that are closely tied to prevention-sacrifices occasioned
by increases in the government's surveillance as well as by its detention and
perhaps other powers-may not be needed only in the wake of an attack. If
increased surveillance and detention efforts can help prevent an attack, then
surely we should want those powers to be available on September 10 even
more than on September 12. The idea of sharply marking an emergency
period, at least from this perspective, makes little sense even if we overlook
the point just made about the impossibility of confining responses to the
latest attack within any tightly defined circle of government action.
Professor Ackerman's justification for the emergency approach is
largely grounded in the specter of a terrorist "second strike." The language
seems to be borrowed from the Cold War nuclear strategy lexicon, thus
calling to mind an immediate second attack, i.e., one launched within hours.
(Within the Cold War model, actually, a second strike would follow
retaliation for a first strike.) Perhaps, therefore, a greater risk is present just
after a terrorist attack-since, as September 11 and the Madrid bombings
horrifyingly showed, al Qaeda conspirators (or their associates or
successors) were and likely still are capable of launching dramatic,
coordinated, multiple attacks. In the future, other groups might possess a
similar reserve capacity. But Ackerman's proposal for emergency powers is
both unhelpful and unnecessary in the hours following an attack; the
government already has considerable powers to detain suspects and take
other measures (e.g., grounding flights, barricading streets, and stopping all
cars) in truly exigent circumstances, and, in any event, Congress could not
meet to authorize additional powers until the immediate threat had passed.
But as for the months that follow, the period that Ackerman's proposal
emphasizes, nothing suggests that attacks are more likely then than at any
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other time. Al Qaeda's style (and that of other terrorist groups) seems to be
to attack when we least expect it, not when we're most on guard.
10 5
Two conclusions, sadly ironic, in effect summarize the difficulties in
Professor Ackerman's design that we have been sketching.
First, the constitutional cost of Ackerman's wager must not be
underestimated. Within his scenario, as the "real Constitution" repeatedly
alternates with succeeding "emergency constitutions," the fact that each
emergency constitution, and its series of supermajority extensions, will be
succeeded in time by another will appear to declare that each emergency
constitution failed-failed to prevent the next attack. This history, we think,
will virtually guarantee that the next emergency constitution will include
fewer protections of rights than its predecessor. The framework will be
amended. The upshot is that the Ackerman algorithm guarantees an
interrupted or punctuated version of the downward spiral he plainly fears.
But there is no systematic mechanism, within his scheme, to prevent the
succession of emergency constitutions from provoking this spiral.
Second, in one important regard, the terrorist risk may increase.
Terrorists needn't master rocket science to find an optimal strategy. It's
no wonder that our nation's recent resort to color-coded signals to announce
the government's recommended level of apprehension seems so surreal.
The system obviously offers less guidance to our civilian population ("go
shopping but be on the alert!") than to would-be terrorists, telling them
when our guard is down. Anything like the Ackerman proposal would only
make matters worse. At its heart, the proposal is a transparent scheme with
a binary "on air" signal that tells friend and foe alike precisely what it takes
to plunge the nation into Code Red for real, what emergency powers are
triggered and what rights suspended when the light is on, and exactly how
long to wait-no secret because the time limits and congressional processes
for extending states of emergency have to be spelled out in the Ackerman
scheme-before those emergency powers will be turned off. Planning the
next attack and gauging how best to disrupt our normal routines--even to
make us sacrifice some of the rights we say define us as a nation-becomes
that much easier. Rather than building up our immune system, any such
scheme seems perversely designed to break it down, heightening our
vulnerability to painful and programmed convulsions whenever the
105. Of course, some genuine emergency responses will be required: containing the scope of
the tragedy (e.g., preventing hazardous materials from spreading through the water supply);
minimizing casualties through rescue efforts; rebuilding destroyed areas; aiding victims; and
creating clear lines of succession and procedures for restoring operations if important government
buildings are destroyed or officials killed. All of these functions should be planned in advance,
with a coherent statutory framework, to enable the best response and to reassure the public. But
these responses don't, at least for the most part, raise hard constitutional questions, and they
therefore don't demand and certainly can't justify an "emergency constitution."
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terrorists choose to strike. Why one would want to do them that favor is a
mystery to us.
How, then, should we think about the importance and limits of ordinary
constitutional law, on the assumption of constant risk? What if we want to
think through government responses more nuanced and less crude than
preventive detention-responses involving curfews and evacuations, new
types of border control, new forms of surveillance or of data compilation,
government planting of deliberate disinformation, electronic signal
interceptions, tightened restrictions on access to hitherto-public information
and facilities, and so forth? These questions, we can see, all fall outside the
frame of Bruce Ackerman's picture of states of emergency. We need
another account.
II. CONSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONS, EMERGENCIES
Such an account would address two topics: the question of institutional
arrangements in emergency situations, and the question of individual rights.
As we have seen, Professor Ackerman gives priority to the first of these.
We ultimately emphasize the second. Before we reach the question of
rights-the principal preoccupation of ordinary constitutional adjudication
within emergency periods-we revisit the question of institutions. This
time, we work less within Ackerman's own proposals than without. We
consider what he takes for granted and what he leaves out.
A. "The Constitution as an Institution'10 6
Ackerman begins This Is Not a War with a discussion of presidential
rhetoric. "There is something about the presidency that loves war-talk."10' 7
He believes that martial imagery, however useful, may be dangerous-
especially now. "An embrace of the 'war on terrorism' can generate a
dynamic that justifies the permanent and broad-scale destruction of
fundamental rights."10 8 He derives grim conclusions from recent events:
President Bush... has already won in the court of public opinion.
... [T]here is a very large risk that future presidents-
Republicans and Democrats alike-will escalate war-talk in
response to terrorist attacks.... So long as the general public
accepts the notion that America can make "war" on something as
amorphous as "terrorism," future presidents will have a much easier
106. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1934).
107. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1872.
108. Id. at 1872-73.
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time convincing the nation to engage in old-fashioned wars against
sovereign states.109
The framework statute-the idea of the emergency constitution-will,
Professor Ackerman argues, work to reduce presidential resort to war-talk.
It is, he says, "a new bulwark against the presidential war-dynamic."110 The
framework statute will be the originating source of a new rhetoric. "This is
not a war, but a state of emergency."111
When the next terrorist strike occurs, we should not turn to our
television sets to see the President... heating up the war-talk to an
even higher pitch. It would be far better to see him go before
Congress and somberly request its support for a declaration of a
limited state of emergency.
Understood as straightforward argument, Professor Ackerman's
discussion of war-talk is at best puzzling; so understood, it falls apart at the
lightest touch. Ackerman's proposal does not, after all, include a
presidential muzzle clause. He seems simply to suppose that the idea of the
"state of emergency" of itself possesses enough rhetorical heft--despite the
numerous such "states" we have declared that have never been formally
ended. 113 Instead of rattling a saber, the President will be empowered to
sound an air raid siren and declare an(other) "emergency." But why,
precisely, would a president eschew the rhetorical opportunity to rally his
troops, both military and political, and fend off an attacking army with talk
of war? Ackerman seemingly appreciates these worries. "[T]he mere
availability of a new framework doesn't guarantee its use."" 4 There is also,
he recognizes, an obvious, and worst-of-both-worlds, possibility-"the
President embraces both war-talk and the new powers granted to him by the
emergency statute."' "5 And why in the world wouldn't he?
We do not read Ackerman so literally. His claim that the existence of
the framework statute and its availability for use will constrain presidential
rhetoric is too palpably problematic to be taken seriously as a real-world
strategy. But what he puts forward here is also, we would suggest, a kind of
parable (provokery!)-a reminder that constitutional ideas are not just
frameworks, but starting points for politics, and thus sources of institutions.
109. Id. at 1876.
110. Id. at 1873.
111. Id.
112. Id. Professor Ackerman entertainingly contrasts what he imagines a presidential rhetoric
should sound like with an artful conjunction of our most Henry James-like sentences. See id. at
1875. We will stipulate that our language here is not the language of presidential speechwriters.
113. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1077-81.
114. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1900.
115. Id. at 1901 (emphasis added).
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Institutions organize the thinking of individuals within them, we all know,
and this defines in turn limits of plausible rhetoric. We agree with Professor
Ackerman that sensitivity to institutional dynamics is an important element
in constitutional inquiry. We propose to take such dynamics seriously
indeed in discussing here a dimension of Ackerman's emergency
constitution that is not at all fanciful or allegorical-its use of the basic
constitutional proposition that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the
President and Congress should act concurrently.
The Constitution's terms suggest, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declared, and Congress and the President often enough agree, that Congress
and the President are to act concurrently, whenever possible, in committing
the United States to extraordinary courses. Professor Ackerman-sketching
an emergency constitution that he otherwise depicts as pretty much
independent of the ordinary constitutional law of individual rights-starts
from this institutional presupposition as well. His scheme is thus a notably
selective exercise in innovation. It is a reasonable question, we think, to ask
whether the deference that Ackerman pays to concurrency, to the ordinary
pattern of institutional interaction, is consistent with the thinking that
underlies Ackerman's concern for states of emergency. Or is Professor
Ackerman-once again the realist, consciously or unconsciously-simply
acknowledging the inertial difficulties confronting a more thoroughgoing
effort? The institutional politics that the Constitution's design prompts
is too much to take on. Given this assumption, though, the onesidedness
of Ackerman's scheme-its manifestly partial erasure of ordinary
constitutional thinking-seems particularly problematic.
1. The Ubiquity of Concurrency
Given Professor Ackerman's doubts that the judicial process can
contribute very much to the ends he seeks-and given his preference that
the legislative branch play the lead in the drama that pits freedom from
terrorist attack against freedom from government assault on liberty-it
seems a shame that he doesn't pay more attention to the successful role the
American judiciary has in fact played in framing the processes of
government so that prior legislative approval is a prerequisite for a number
of broad categories of executive action. Such categories include even those
thought by American presidents to be matters of the most imperative
necessity, perhaps not in terrorism cases as such, but in military
emergencies when presidents predictably trot out the standard arguments
about how slow and sluggish legislative bodies tend to be and how rapid
must be our response to swiftly changing conditions. Notwithstanding
executive arguments of necessity or of inherent authority, and with little if
any demonstrable ill effect, courts have often held prior approval by
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Congress to be indispensable in a wide range of pressing circumstances-
sometimes requiring the whole nine yards of formal bicameral passage and
presentment to the President for veto subject to override only by a two-
thirds majority of both houses. Judicial restrictions of this kind have been
imposed upon presidential seizures of privately owned businesses to supply
American troops engaged in military combat abroad,1 l6 presidential
invocation of the injunctive powers of the courts to restrain the publication
of classified documents bearing on the internal process of decisionmaking
in the conduct of an ongoing war,117 and, of course, presidential use of
military commissions to put American citizens on trial for allegedly
conspiring with the enemy and actively endangering United States troops
engaged in battle, at least where the civilian courts are still functioning and
martial law has not been declared.'
18
Nor does Professor Ackerman seem particularly interested in the kinds
of "framework" statutes that Congress has sometimes enacted, not at the
prod of the judiciary but under its own steam, in order to ensure that
specified sorts of deprivation by the Executive, emergency or no
emergency, not be instituted without specific authorization by act of
Congress.' 19 Thus, although he does discuss the National Emergencies Act
of 1976, Professor Ackerman has nothing to say about the Non-Detention
Act of 1971-enacted to prevent a recurrence of the shameful treatment of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry approved in the infamous
Korematsu decision-which provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned
or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress. 12°
116. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (enjoining President
Truman's seizure of steel mills in the face of his claim that the seizure was necessary to prevent
work stoppages and maintain a steady flow of weapons to U.S. forces in South Korea).
117. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). The point is
made repeatedly in the several individual opinions of the Justices. See id. at 718 (Black, J.,
concurring); id. at 722-23 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 740
(White, J., concurring); id. at 741-42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
118. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866); see also id. at 139-41 (Chase,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On the complexities and significance of Milligan,
see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5, at 9-18.
119. Ackerman does not discuss the War Powers Resolution-perhaps the most famous
framework attempt. This may be because the Resolution does not, within its own terms, announce
any changes in individual rights. It is also, of course, a matter of some debate as to how
successfully the Resolution has worked. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 48-49 (1993).
120. Non-Detention Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, § l(a), 85 Stat. 347, 347 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that U.S. citizens captured in the United States cannot be held as enemy combatants pursuant to
the President's commander-in-chief powers), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027).
The decision relied in part on the Non-Detention Act, reasoning that the Act's requirement of
legislative authorization for the detainment of U.S. citizens was not satisfied by the Authorization
for Use of Military Force passed on September 18, 2001. See id. at 722-23. The September 18
authorization did not extend to detaining a U.S. citizen apprehended in the United States and
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Only some such frameworks are put in place by Congress. Others are
inscribed specifically in constitutional text, as with the explicit command of
the Third Amendment that, "in time of peace," no home may, "without the
consent of the Owner," be taken over by the military, however supposedly
essential to the defense of the nation, "nor in time of war, but in a manner to
be prescribed by law." Other such framing precepts have been inferred
without much fanfare from the basic architecture of the Constitution,
understood as a blueprint for government. An illustration is the long-settled
proposition that the President may not suspend the writ of habeas corpus
without congressional authorization-a proposition whose wisdom we do
not doubt but whose derivation appears to rest in large part on the
underwhelming ground that the Constitution's provision expressly
authorizing suspension of the writ ("when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it") 121 is to be found in Article I, which
'vest[s] in ... congress"' "'all legislative powers therein granted.' 122 Still
other such framework-defining principles have been extrapolated by courts
from considerably more sophisticated arguments drawing on a mix of
textual, structural, and functional considerations suggested by the
Constitution and the history both of its founding and of its interpretation.
That has been the case with each of the examples noted above-involving
seizures of private property, restraints on publication, and trials by military
tribunals.
2. The Costs of Inertia
Whatever their derivation, these commitments to congressional
authorization (rather than mere congressional acquiescence) constitute, we
think, more than a disconnected set of default rules that all just happen to
stay the presidential hand even when it wields the sword of war in periods
of sudden peril. On the contrary, these requirements-tightly linked and
interrelated, although honored sometimes in the breach-both memorialize
and give life to the constitutional (or, at times, congressional) recognition of
what we take to be the hard-learned lesson of our past: Precisely when our
peril seems greatest, we dare not entrust our fate to the judgment of any one
individual, even though that individual be elected by the whole People of
suspected of cooperating with al Qaeda to detonate a radioactive device on U.S. soil. See id. at
723. Because the Constitution granted powers to both Congress and the President to act in a
matter of this sort, unilateral presidential authority could not be inferred. See id. at 715.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
122. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, Circuit
Justice) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1). On the derivation of the principle from the arrangement
of the Constitution's vesting articles, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 32-42 (1998); and 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-11, at 725 n.15 (3d ed. 2000).
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the United States.123 These are the commitments whose binding force
persists through crisis and calm alike-even, in other words, during genuine
emergencies. 124
These commitments are basic pillars of the Constitution within which
Professor Ackerman hopes to situate his "emergency constitution," and-to
the degree they reflect an insistence that Congress be consulted and its
approval be secured for executive actions in a large number of areas where
the President, left to his own devices, might well prefer a hefty dose of
completely unilateral power-it seems noteworthy that the Ackerman
Constitution, resting as it does on a measure he would have Congress enact,
does not undertake to sidestep or pull down those pillars. The Ackerman
Constitution, in these respects, accepts and incorporates the Constitution as
it ordinarily stands. The reason, presumably, is not that the requirement of
congressional approval might not get in the way of effective responses to
terrorist threats; reordering our constitutional structure to give the President
vastly enlarged essentially lawmaking powers might enhance the nation's
safety and security more than would relaxing the legal constraints on
rounding up the usual suspects in a massive dragnet. The reason that
changes of that sort are off the Ackerman table, we may suspect, is that they
would be nonstarters in light of the interests they would palpably
compromise. Constitutional law, we all know, begets constitutional politics.
Obviously enough, the pertinent interests in this regard appear not to
include the interests of those thousands of individuals most likely to be
rounded up and imprisoned as persons suspected of supporting terrorism in
some way.12 5 Equally obviously, the constitutional provisions that define
123. For a discussion of these linked requirements of prior congressional approval in the
particular setting of presidential proposals to set up and conduct a system of military tribunals for
enemy combatants charged, among other things, with crimes against the laws of war, see Neal K.
Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals,
111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1298-308 (2001). See also Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract:
Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right To Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1309-16
(1991).
124. The exception, one always supposes, is for emergencies that qualify as fully
existential-those that so threaten our very survival as a nation that it would become absurd to
worry much about the constitutionality of our mode of proceeding (the old "rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titanic" syndrome).
125. We would certainly reject the suggestion, commonly heard but never so far as we are
aware convincingly defended, that constitutional rules that describe or constitute institutions of
governance and the organizing relations among them-sometimes described as the "structural"
rules-belong in the "fixed-until-expressly-amended" camp, while constitutional rules that
recognize human rights against a particular branch or level of government (or sometimes against
government in general) belong in the "suspendable-when-things-get-really-tough" camp. Apart
from the fairly obvious difficulty of characterizing any number of rules (such as rules about fair
trials, or rules about the separation of church and state) as belonging in one camp or the other,
there is the even more fundamental problem that virtually all rules and principles worthy of
inclusion in a constitution ultimately relate to the allocation of decisionmaking authority over
various matters among potentially competing centers of power. These centers of power range
from the "person" variously conceived and defined, to the "family" in its many guises, to any
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004] 1835
The Yale Law Journal
the respective powers and responsibilities of the great branches and levels
of government figure as sacrosanct within Professor Ackerman's scheme
not because they are the least likely to stand in the way of enhanced safety
and security: To the contrary, the deliberate inefficiencies built into our
fabled system of checks and balances may be among the greatest obstacles
to a rapid and fully effective response to terror. Nor does the reassurance
function explain Ackerman's allegiance to divided government; it cannot be
claimed that suspending key features of our intentionally fractured system
of diffused power would be less conspicuous or dramatic, and hence less
potentially reassuring, than suspending protections against censorship or
lifting requirements for search warrants. From the perspective of
Ackerman's own concerns, his deference is thus inexplicable. He is,
instead, acknowledging a constraint. Constitutional inertia is at its
maximum when a proposed change would rearrange the principal lines of
government authority and thereby destabilize existing patterns of power and
privilege among those who govern.12 6
Asking those in positions of power under the status quo to restrict their
own freedom of action or to rearrange their respective shares of authority
entails asking for that which government officials are most loath to give.
Proponents of a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution learned
that lesson and had to settle for framework legislation of varying degrees of
efficacy. Of course, constitutional amendments of any sort-including,
happily, amendments to dilute or delete portions of the Bill of Rights-are
notoriously difficult to enact in our system, partly because of the design of
the amendment process and partly because of the symbolic attachment of
the culture to provisions like the First or Fourth Amendment, at least when
so identified. But proposals to relax on a temporary basis some of the
restrictions that such amendments impose on government activities,
number of intermediate associations and organizations, to the bureaus and departments of
government-including, in a federal system like ours, both the state and local governments on the
one hand, and the national government on the other. There is no sound reason for imagining that
either type of rule or principle is, as a general proposition, more "basic" than the other in any
sense relevant to how resilient and resistant to claims of emergency need any given rule or
principle ought to be.
Indeed, if one had to stake a claim to a rule's appropriate degree of insulation from
arguments for emergency suspension, one would probably choose a rule that corresponded to a
human rights norm reflected in customary and written international instruments and in all or
virtually all national constitutions-such as a norm about equal dignity before the law or about
freedom from torture or about rights to intimate personal association-rather than a rule that
appeared highly contingent and peculiar to the organizing structure chosen by a few societies and
rejected by many others.
126. It is principally for this reason that proposals to streamline our cumbersome tripartite
system of separated powers by borrowing some of the most successful features of parliamentary
structures are such predictable perennial nonstarters. Arguments that the genius of our system
might be preserved through arrangements that are less prone to deadlock at crucial times may or
may not have merit, but their deficiencies, such as they are, do not explain the reason such
arguments get no serious hearing in the United States.
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packaged as antiterrorism techniques in a suitably labeled framework
statute, may well fall within the range of the politically possible. Professor
Ackerman, of course, does not acknowledge and surely would not accept
this premise. The limits of his proposal, however, call attention to the
impact of this constitutional inertia. When we think about candidates for
temporary suspension in an emergency constitution, the reasons for
focusing on human rights against government oppression bear little or no
logical connection to the underlying case for such a constitution, if a case
for it indeed can be made.
This is injustice (there seems no way to avoid the term). Its shadow, we
suspect, would cloud whatever Ackerman's scheme otherwise
accomplishes. Professor Ackerman indeed thinks so too. His compensation
scheme is at bottom a mechanism of corrective justice-a means of
undoing the wrong (a wrong that he hopes to minimize). No doubt the
money matters. But whether or not the individual recipients would regard
their awards as adequate compensation, whether or not the individuals that
Ackerman identifies are the only persons arbitrarily constrained during his
states of emergency, it is not likely that the roundups, the incarcerations,
and the interrogations would disappear from public memory. There is, of
course, a cost to this too. We return to this question shortly.
B. Institutions and Emergencies: The Easy Case for Constitutional
Change
Perhaps because he leaves institutional politics largely as it is, Professor
Ackerman pretty much ignores a more obvious agenda for constitutional
reform-identifying and closing constitutional gaps to ensure continuity in
and preservation of the republican form of the federal government in the
event of a terrorist attack that leaves the nation intact but decapitates or
cripples one or more of the three national branches.
Article IV, Section 4 of our Constitution leaves to "[t]he United States,"
without further specification, the task of "guarantee[ing] to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government" and puts on the United
States the onus of "protect[ing] each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence." Unlike Article IV, Section
1-which empowers "Congress ... by general Laws" to "prescribe the
Manner in which... [public] Acts, Records and [judicial] Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof' and thereby creates an assured vehicle
through which Congress may implement that same Article's Full Faith and
Credit Clause-Article IV, Section 4 leaves up in the air the form and locus
of any implementing power.
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If we construe Article IV as vesting a power and not merely an
obligation in the U.S. government, then the Constitution is, happily, gapless
when it comes to a chain of authority for protecting a state against, for
example, a military takeover by terrorists who proceed to install a theocratic
government. For the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8,
empowers Congress to make whatever laws might rationally be deemed
useful "for carrying into Execution... all... Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof."' 127 But there is at least a question as to whether Article
IV is a vesting provision at all, so the constitutional basis for emergency
congressional intervention to protect a state's people from terrorist takeover
and its aftermath is not absolutely clear. 128
Even more serious is a gap of a related but different sort. Who, one
might ask, is out there to guarantee the United States of America as such
will remain a constitutional republic? That the states will not be stripped
without their Consent of their equal representation in the Senate-
something that Article V says not even a constitutional amendment may
do? 129 That we will be able to absorb and survive anything less than a fully
existential strike at our core?
If we were one day to be absorbed into a transatlantic or transpacific or
fully global political/legal entity, then that entity or one of its arms might
become our guarantor-just as the mission of coming to the defense of a
member state of NATO that has been unlawfully attacked, as we were on
September 11, 2001, falls to that alliance. But just as any one of our fifty
states may need, at least in theory, some mechanism for asserting its own
sovereignty vis-d-vis external attack should the central government be
crippled, so our central government presumably cannot treat the prospect of
being defended by NATO or by the United Nations as sufficient to defend
against a similar assault. Our nation needs a greater guarantee in the event
of an attack that is not (or need not be) existentially catastrophic, but is
unusually grave in that it disables, for example, the Office of the President,
the Senate, the House of Representatives, or the Supreme Court.
Should it be the President who is disabled or assassinated, the
Constitution finally provides a fairly seamless recovery mechanism-not
necessarily for the President, to be sure, but for the presidency-in Article
II as amended by the Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments,
which together address most of the grim scenarios that might unfold and
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
128. To the degree any such takeover were to come in the form of an "insurrection" or an
"invasion," Congress could, of course, invoke its explicit authority "[t]o provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." Id. § 8,
cl. 15.
129. "[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."
Id. art. V.
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which expressly empower Congress to fill out the remaining possibilities
and all the details. But should terrorists ever succeed in doing what the
September 11 hijackers evidently intended to do, and hit the Capitol or the
Supreme Court while Congress or the Court is in session, it doesn't take a
world-class imagination to read the Constitution and figure out that,
unfortunately, the document offers only an incomplete blueprint for what
comes next. 1
30
This is, moreover, the kind of incompleteness that quite plainly cannot
be overcome by any hermeneutical exercise: Complete blanks appear where
one might expect to find answers to questions about "what happens
if'... all the sitting Justices are killed or disabled? Or "what happens
if'.. so many members of the House or Senate are killed or disabled that
there is no quorum to conduct business and enact legislation? Neither
interpretation nor a mere statute enacted by Congress in anticipation of such
a disaster would suffice to remove the debilitating cloud of doubt about the
constitutionality of whatever choices have been made. This incompleteness
truly is a gap in the constitutional structure, and it is one that can be filled
only if we amend the Constitution to add a provision addressing
possibilities not contemplated in Article I, Section 2, Clause 4 (dealing with
vacancies in the House of Representatives), 31 in the Seventeenth
Amendment, Clause 2 (dealing with vacancies in the Senate), 132 or
elsewhere in the current document. Unless we're willing to take our
chances that an event requiring this kind of provision just won't occur and
that, if it does, either we'll be lucky enough to improvise our way out of the
ensuing chaos (a near impossibility) or the event will be so horrendous that
no constitutional provision would be of use, we had better get going on this
matter without delay. Happily, an impressive bipartisan group has been at
work for some time preparing possible alternatives for the necessary gap-
filling amendment. The technical and frankly boring nature of the task
130. The blueprint is not incomplete in the standard sense that a word such as "liberty" or a
phrase such as "freedom of speech" or "the free exercise of religion" has many possible meanings
and, given the familiar problems of infinite regress, the Constitution has no way of specifying
beyond all ambiguity and beyond all possibility of change just which of those meanings is to
govern in what context and in what way. Our Constitution copes with that kind of incompleteness
by implicitly entrusting each branch with the task of construing the Constitution for itself, with a
preeminent role-how and why and in what respects preeminent, we will not get into here-going
to the Supreme Court. The Constitution itself also supplies two master "default" rules for cases of
doubt, by allocating power to the states when its locus in the national government cannot be
affirmed (the Tenth Amendment), and by reserving some matters for the people themselves to
decide even when the enumeration of rights against government somehow failed to cover the
matters in question (the Ninth Amendment).
131. "When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority
thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
132. "When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive
authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until
the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct." Id. amend. XVII, cl. 2.
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should help in securing congressional promulgation and rapid state
legislative ratification of a suitable provision, which would of necessity
include an empowering clause leaving various details to Congress. 133
C. Inertia and Injustice Revisited
The kinds of legal measures that Professor Ackerman contemplates
putting in place to cope with terrorist-triggered emergencies that do not
decapitate parts of the government are measures, he recognizes, that would
not be likely to survive constitutional challenge today even with the
flexibility that many parts of the Bill of Rights (think "unreasonable
searches and seizures," for instance) already incorporate--or, worse still,just might survive such challenge but only at the cost of terrible distortions
in the law of the Constitution that remains to guide future generations.1 34
Changes of that sort, needless to say, are anything but technical or boring.
As such, they would, given the great difficulty that attends ratification of
any deeply controversial constitutional amendment in this country, be
virtually impossible to enact in the constitutional amendment form that
would otherwise be the natural procedure to follow. That much, of course,
Professor Ackerman acknowledges-hence his suggestion that the
framework he has in mind be put in place by a simple act of Congress.
The gamble in Ackerman's proposal-or one of its gambles at any
rate-is that, despite their constitutionally shady character, the pieces of his
framework statute could come to be accepted not as "constitutional" in the
usual sense,135 but as something we could learn to live with under a
nonbinding but mutually advantageous social compact. And, having agreed
to live with it, we would, Ackerman hopes, agree that specific steps taken
by the President or others within the ambit of that emergency constitution
(put in place, remember, by a mere act of Congress) would be subject to
review only under the terms and procedures that the "emergency
133. The Continuity of Government Commission, initiated by the American Enterprise
Institute in the fall of 2002 to deal with this set of issues, held hearings that fall and issued a report
in June 2003 on the continuity of Congress. It is now addressing continuity in the Supreme Court
and problems in the statute addressing presidential succession. Relevant information may be
found at Continuity of Government Commission, http://www.continuityofgovemment.org (last
visited Feb. 16, 2004). For one suggested solution, see S.J. Res. 23, 108th Cong. (2003), a
proposed constitutional amendment dealing with the consequences of the death or incapacitation
of one-fourth or more of the membership of either house of Congress.
134. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(worrying about the "loaded weapon" that a constitutional interpretation capable of supporting the
government's actions will leave lying about in the form of dangerous precedent).
135. After all, the distortion of constitutional law (and thus of the Constitution as we
ordinarily encounter it) in the name of necessity is one of the evils Ackerman seeks to avoid
through his proposal.
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constitution," rather than our ordinary Constitution, would have put in
place.
136
As we have already noted, the victims of the kinds of steps Professor
Ackerman has in mind are unlikely to be among society's most powerful
and best-represented members. He is not proposing, for instance, that the
emergency constitution would permit the President to make temporary
treaties to cope with global terrorism in a multilateral way without the usual
rigamarole of ratification by two-thirds of the senators present-something
that might actually make a greater difference in terms of protecting the
public than would broader arrest or surveillance powers, but that would also
immediately incur the concerted and fatal opposition of many senators, and
that would not, in any event, provide the drama that his argument suggests
is needed in order to reassure the public.
Thus, rounding up the usual suspects in the world according to
Ackerman would come to mean not just what it has always meant but one
thing more: To have a snowball's chance of creating, and then insulating
from utter deconstruction, what amounts to a period of constitutional
amnesia, you've got to round up the usual set of rights to sacrifice-not
necessarily the rights that are most essential to combating terrorism
effectively, but the rights that have the weakest political constituencies. It
ought not to be necessary, at this late date, to recount in detail the most
troubling aspects of government responses to September 11-the too-often-
accepted invitations to discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, or
religion, notwithstanding President Bush's contrary appeals. Dean Edley
put it succinctly: "[M]inorities, old and new, are in the soup. ' 13 7 Professor
Ackerman is, of course, aware of our contemporary history-and he is
rightly troubled. But his scheme does little more than try to fix time limits
for our worst moments. These limits might provoke useful debate, stir an
"informed civic discourse" that would "soon retrieve the inconvenient
liberties scatt[er]ed in the gutter." '138 We think that a less oblique response is
in order. Indeed, we would propose something very much like a principle of
justice. Our recent experience is harbinger enough of such a sufficiently
unappealing prospect that it should oblige us to take account of the full
136. Part of the difficulty, of course, is that our "ordinary" Constitution already contains
provisions specifically dealing with war and warlike emergencies. As we have already noted, the
Third Amendment provides that only "in time of war" may government quarter soldiers in
someone's home without the owner's consent and that, even in wartime, such military occupation
must be in accord with a "law" enacted by Congress. And the Suspension Clause specifies that the
great writ may be suspended only "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, and then only, it has been held, pursuant to and in
conformity with a "law" enacted by Congress, see supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
137. Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/ll, in
THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 170, 192 (Richard C.
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
138. Id.
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range of resources available to better the odds that no scheme would be
accepted if the particular constituencies who would be most at risk from its
implementation entirely exclude the movers and shakers of our society. To
bring this position to bear, we need-along with a lot more besides-to
consider how to put ordinary constitutional law to work. 139
III. AGAINST THUCYDIDES
Professor Ackerman appears to believe that however matters appear
within the moment itself, it will too often be obvious after the fact that
executive officials and judges alike had, in the emergency, "changed the
accepted meanings of words as they saw fit.,' 140 It is this Thucydidean
pessimism (or realism), ultimately, that underlies Ackerman's conclusion
that constitutional guarantees and judicial review mean so little. "When the
language in which the world is constituted falls apart, it becomes
impossible, as Thucydides shows us, not only to act rationally within it but
to make satisfactory sense of it.' 14 1 Are Ackerman and Thucydides right
that we need to worry about this particular danger now?
We appear to have reached, in the spring of 2004, a time in which
judges are beginning to come to grips with the emergency measures
adopted by the government in the wake of September 11, 2001, even while
those measures remain in force. The Supreme Court has recently agreed to
review three cases, at current count, concerned with direct challenges to
these measures, and one other case in which a state supreme court opinion
evoked "emergency" concerns.142 Both within the judicial process and in
the public sphere generally, there has also been much stock-taking
139. The supermajority rules that Professor Ackerman would write into the framework statute
would not pose much of a constitutional problem from the perspective of future Congresses if, as
Ackerman supposes, the supermajority rules could be repealed by majority vote. Ackerman, supra
note 8, at 1089; see also I TRIBE, supra note 122, § 2-3, at 124 n.1. But what if Congress, in a
given instance, failed to extend a state of emergency by the needed margin, even though a
majority voted for it? Could the President claim that the majority vote was all that Congress could
require constitutionally, and insist that the emergency remained in force?
140. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 130 (Walter Blanco trans., Walter Blanco &
Jennifer Tolbert Roberts eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 1998). This phrase is also famously translated
as referring to times (originally civil war) "when words themselves los[e] their meaning." E.g.,
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 3 (1984).
141. WHITE, supra note 140, at 90.
142. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that U.S. citizens
detained in the United States cannot be held as enemy combatants pursuant to the President's
commander-in-chief powers), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027); Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas
petitions brought by detainees at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003)(Nos. 03-334, 03-343); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a U.S.
citizen captured abroad could be held as an enemy combatant solely on the basis of a Department
of Defense affidavit), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696). The state case is Hiibel
v. Sixth Judicial District Court ex rel. County of Humboldt, 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev. 2002), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 430 (2003) (No. 03-5554).
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underway in the past year or so, including efforts to assess the damage done
legally, politically, and culturally by the initial governmental responses to
the attacks, and to assess as well the possibilities of rectification and
redress. How much has actually been accomplished, or will be
accomplished, remains to be seen, of course. But rumors of the recent death
of all critical capacity seem, at this writing, to be greatly exaggerated.
Professor Ackerman may be mistaken if he supposes that constitutional
reassessment can be productively undertaken only during times of calm and
not in crisis. Indeed, sharply distinguishing between crisis and calm-or
between declared emergency and nonemergency, as Ackerman's model
would have it-may obscure an important possibility. "Emergencies" may
progress in stages, and opportunity for reassessment may thus overlap
"emergency" administration. If so, there may still be a part to play for
ordinary, elaborately articulated constitutional law, at least within the
course of sufficiently extended states of emergency.
141
A. Some Perhaps Positive Examples
In this regard, Professor Ackerman's discussion of Korematsu v. United
States is especially provocative. Ackerman treats Korematsu as "common
law fog" at its worst, illustrative of the leeway that the usual constitutional
law formulations leave judges to acquiesce in profoundly troubling
emergency measures--even Justices as assertedly and assertively rigorous
as Hugo Black. If Black, then anyone. And, Ackerman observes, it took a
long time to undo Korematsu.
Readers of Eugene Rostow-Ackerman is one, of course-know that
direct attack on Korematsu began almost immediately. 144 (It is also true, of
course, that official acknowledgement, apology, and sadly small reparations
payments were decades late.) But we all also know that Korematsu, decided
at the end of 1944, was not itself emergency adjudication as such. Like
Hirabayashi v. United States a year earlier, 145 Korematsu did not require the
143. In the discussion that follows we draw our examples from crises that do not precisely fit
Professor Ackerman's model of a state of emergency. The internment of Japanese Americans in
1942 followed a troubling sequence of stated fears of invasion, exercises in economic
opportunism coupled with racism, and tabloid sensationalizing-not panic as such. The
emergency in India in 1975 was a period of high political tension, but more an internal matter than
an externally provoked crisis. The Cold War did involve an external adversary, did involve threats
of horrific violence, and did feature periodic crises, but it was a conflict between governments (as
well as much more). We think that in each of these periods, however, judiciaries came under
stress, and that the responses of the judges in these circumstances suggest something important
about how well or badly positioned judges are likely to be to deal with at least some dimensions
of terrorism crises of the sort that Ackerman emphasizes. We certainly are not making the claim
that all emergencies are the same.
144. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945).
145. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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Supreme Court to rule at the peak of crisis: Although the war overseas
continued, any real prospect of Japanese military attack on the American
mainland was past. The Court was well-positioned, therefore, to recognize
the changed setting and to undertake an exercise in reassessment. The
opportunity had presented itself to stage an inquest-to treat review of the
convictions at issue in either Korematsu or Hirabayashi as an occasion to
judge the constitutional damage done by forced removal and confinement in
1942 of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. Had the Court
concluded that the prosecutions under review were wrongful, constitutional
commitments would have been reinforced, and the injustice suffered by
confined Japanese Americans would have been acknowledged. It is this
refusal to seize that moment, we may think, first in Hirabayashi and then
especially obviously in Korematsu, that in important part fuels justified
outrage (and for some, cynicism) over and above the sense of shame and
anger provoked by the detention policy itself. 46
Not long before Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court had demonstrated in
spectacular fashion its ability to give critical consideration to measures
propelled by wartime fervors or fears. West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette147 not only overturned the Court's own earlier
approval of mandatory flag salutes in public schools; Justice Jackson's
majority opinion also stood (and stands) as a notably eloquent summary of
ideals informing constitutional law and American government. Korematsu
in particular cannot bear comparison. Justice Black acknowledged the
constitutionally suspect status of racial classifications at the outset. 48 But in
the course of affirming the conviction in Korematsu, Black worked
conspicuously to drain the case of any large significance, narrowing the
range of official actions reviewed and characterizing as abstractly as
possible the concerns prompting those actions. This approach, as the
dissenters in Korematsu were perhaps the first to note, obviously smacked
of apologetics. 149 What we know now-concerning the conduct of
government lawyers, the vagaries of scheduling, and the like-suggests
worse and surely does not exclude the Supreme Court from criticism. 5 0
But Korematsu was also the companion case to Ex parte Endo,15 1
handed down the same day. Justice Black appears to have drafted
Korematsu with an eye to Endo, and Endo, we too rarely recall, closed the
146. See Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REv.
933 (2004).
147. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
148. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (Black, J.).
149. See, e.g., id. at 232 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
150. Jerry Kang makes this point with great force. See Kang, supra note 146, at 949-55,
976-79. For rightly famous pioneering research, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
151. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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camps. 152 Justice Douglas wrote Endo in understated fashion, carefully
noting that the detention camps had come under civilian administration, and
relying crucially on the efforts of administrators to sort "loyal" and
"disloyal" occupants. 153 Yet Endo did ultimately declare that the question of
statutory authorization to hold "loyal" detainees turned on the application of
a rule of interpretation originating in the Constitution's parallel recognition
of individual rights along with government authority. 154 And this way of
proceeding did mark an important choice-albeit only implicitly. In 1942,
the British House of Lords had reached more or less the opposite
conclusion in Liversidge v. Anderson, declaring that usual common law
freedoms were to be treated as irrelevant for purposes of construing security
measures-in that case, detention.155 Such measures were therefore to be
construed only in light of their own immediate aims. 156 Lord Atkin
dissented sharply:
I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere
question of construction when face to face with claims involving
the liberty of the subject show themselves more executive minded
than the executive.... In this country, amid the clash of arms, the
laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same
language in war as in peace. It has always been one of the pillars of
freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which on recent
authority we are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of
persons and stand between the subject and any attempted
encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any
coercive action is justified in law. In this case I have listened to
arguments which might have been addressed acceptably to the
Court of King's Bench in the time of Charles 1.157
Justice Douglas, it would appear, lined up-quietly-with Lord Atkin.15 8
152. For more detailed discussion, see Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1933 (2003).
153. The efforts to ascertain loyalty in the camps are described in disturbing detail in
DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS & RICHARD S. NISHIMOTO, THE SPOILAGE 53-112 (1946).
154. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 298-300. Endo figured prominently in the Second Circuit
majority's opinion in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 722-24 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027). Professor Ackerman works hard to show that his
emergency constitution will suggest grounds for limiting the reach of other statutes seemingly
granting executive officials broad power in times of crisis. See Ackerman, supra note 12, at
1887-89. We have already criticized this effort as implausible on its own terms. See supra text
accompanying notes 98-99. Here, we would note that in Endo and Padilla basic propositions of
ordinary constitutional law were readily put to work to generate such rules of construction-so
readily that, for readers of Endo especially, the constitutional reference is often easy to overlook.
155. [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L. 1942).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 244 (Atkin, L.J., dissenting).
158. Liversidge later "exercised a pervasive influence on the way South African
judges... interpreted security laws" during the apartheid regime. DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD
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It remains an important fact that Douglas did not try to write so
emphatically as Atkin. Even if Endo was an important decision founded on
an important proposition basic to the organization of the Constitution-and
it emphatically was-it did not, as written, address directly those aspects of
internment that were, it appeared, most obviously wrong. There was no
discussion of racial categorization as an evil, of the surrender to prejudice
and economic opportunism, of the extraordinary disruption and insult
introduced into the lives of the individuals confined in the camps.159 It may
be that American constitutional law, at that time, did not possess the
resources needed to address these matters adequately. Justice Jackson, the
author of the Barnette opinion, sought to compose a concurring opinion in
Endo sharper than the Douglas effort, but seemingly did not pursue the
project past an initial typewritten draft.' 60
In any event, we draw this conclusion: There will be opportunities
within a protracted period of emergency for reassessment, as there were in
World War II in connection with internment-and as there surely have been
in the wake of September 11, and as there are bound to be in the aftermath
of later terrorist attacks. Adjudication will be more likely to contribute
to the process, to serve successfully as an inquest, if adjudication
generates-even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently
reasoned dissent-an apt language for potent criticism. Such language must
catch and identify at the time, and not only in distant hindsight, whatever
might be widely understood as profoundly wrong within the emergency
regime. Endo, however much it otherwise accomplished, did not make this
attempt.
It can be done, of course: A conjunction of cases famous in Indian
constitutional law is instructive.
The state of emergency declared by the government of Indira Gandhi in
1975 resulted in the preventive detention of large numbers of suspected
agitators. 16 1 Widely noticed habeas corpus proceedings challenging
CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 85 (1991). On Liversidge within its own context, see generally A.W. BRIAN
SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN
(1992).
159. Professor Kang's criticism of the 1980s decisions granting coram nobis relief to
Korematsu and other internees is also apt criticism of Justice Douglas's opinion: "There was a
moment to write the truth into law. There was a moment to acknowledge honestly a tragic
mistake. There was a moment to show that such opinions can and should be written. That moment
was lost." Kang, supra note 146, at 1004.
160. For the text of the Jackson draft, see Gudridge, supra note 152, at 1969-70; and Dennis
J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese
Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 483-84. Professor Hutchinson's important article
explores at length Justice Jackson's difficulties in settling on a way of approaching Hirabayashi
and Korematsu.
161. As Professor Ackerman notes, the Indian state of emergency followed, most
immediately, decisions of courts, including the Supreme Court of India, that Prime Minister
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detention quickly reached the Supreme Court of India after several lower
courts held that officials were obligated to justify detention by showing that
arrests of particular individuals satisfied the substantive conditions
precedent of the framework statutes setting out emergency procedures. In
Jabalpur v. Shukla, the Supreme Court of India disagreed, holding that the
habeas writ was unavailable within the emergency period.162 Chief Justice
Ray invoked Liversidge at length. 63 The principal issue in dispute
concerned Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which provided that "[n]o
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law." Provisions in the constitution authorized the
president to suspend Article 21 during a state of emergency, and the
presidential order did so in this instance. "The heart of the matter" thus
became "whether Article 21 [was] the sole repository of the right to
personal liberty. If the answer to that question be in the affirmative the
Presidential Order will be a bar., 164 Article 21 was indeed exclusive:
"Article 21 is our Rule of Law regarding life and liberty. No other rule of
law can have separate existence as a distinct right. ' 165 The Liversidge rule
was thus implicit in the constitutional structure: "If there is a pre-
Constitution right which is expressly embodied as a fundamental right
under our Constitution, the common law right has no separate existence
under our Constitution." 166 Ray was untroubled by this result:
Rule of law is not a law of nature consistent and invariable at all
times and in all circumstances. The certainty of law is one of the
elements in the concept of the Rule of Law but it is only one
element and, taken by itself, affords little guidance .... Rule of
Law is a normative as much as it is a descriptive term. It expresses
an ideal as much as a juristic fact. The Rule of Law is not identical
with a free society.
167
Justice Khanna dissented:
Gandhi had not been validly elected to Parliament-it is surely also true that Mrs. Gandhi's own
inclinations to one-person rule were an important part of the story. See Ackerman, supra note 12,
at 1891 n.56. But the situation at the time, it seems, also encompassed other, more complex
dynamics. The events preceding the declaration of emergency, and the politics of the emergency
period itself, are discussed in P.N. DHAR, INDIRA GANDHI, THE "EMERGENCY," AND INDIAN
DEMOCRACY 223-68, 300-51 (2000). For our purposes, in any event, it is the several responses to
the crisis on the part of the Supreme Court of India-and not the preceding events-that are
pertinent.
162. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207. Detainees participating in the litigation included Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, currently Prime Minister of India. See id. at 1207.
163. See id. at 1222-23.
164. Id. at 1228.
165. Id. at 1229.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1234.
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Sanctity of life and liberty was not something new when the
Constitution was drafted. It represented a facet of higher values
which mankind began to cherish in its evolution from a state of
tooth and claw to a civilized existence. Likewise, the principle that
no one shall be deprived of his life and liberty without the authority
of law was not the gift of the Constitution. It was a necessary
corollary of the concept relating to the sanctity of life and liberty;
it existed and was in force before the coming into force of
the Constitution.... Government under law thus seeks the
establishment of an ordered community in which the individual,
aware of his rights and duties, comprehends the area of activity
within which, as a responsible and intelligent person, he may freely
order his life, secure from interference from either the government
or other individuals ....
Even in the absence of Article 21 in the Constitution, the State
has.., no power to deprive a person of his life or liberty without
the authority of law. 168
After eighteen months or so, the state of emergency ended, and election
results drove the Gandhi government from power. The Indian Parliament
amended the constitution to provide that Article 21 remained in force in
states of emergency.1 69 The Supreme Court of India marked the new era
with its decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,1 70 a case
concerning-ironically-suspension of the passport of a relative of the
former prime minister. The attorney general conceded that, contrary to the
assertion of the officials immediately responsible, Gandhi had a right to
challenge the suspension. 71 The court nonetheless took the opportunity to
reread Article 21, declaring that its content derived not just from its own
language, but from the language of other rights stated in the constitution,
and that it was the entirety of these rights that Article 21 enforced. Chief
Justice Beg, in a concurring opinion, made the point especially vividly:
Articles dealing with different fundamental rights contained in
Part III of the Constitution do not represent entirely separate
streams of rights which do not mingle at many points. They are
all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution. Their
168. Id. at 1254-55 (Khanna, J., dissenting).
169. See Gopal Subramanium, Emergency Provisions Under the Indian Constitution, in
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 134, 134-58 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000); see also Derek P.
Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty
in India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 311 (2001).
170. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
171. See id. at 599.
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waters must mix to constitute that grand flow of unimpeded and
impartial Justice (social, economic and political). Freedom (not
only of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, but also
of association, movement, vocation or occupation as well as
of acquisition and possession of reasonable property), of equality
(of status and of opportunity, which imply absence of unreasonable
or unfair discrimination between individuals, groups, and classes),
and of Fraternity (assuring dignity of the individual and the unity of
the nation), which our Constitution visualizes. Isolation of various
aspects of human freedom, for purposes of their protection, is
neither realistic nor beneficial but would defeat the very objects of
such protection.172
This is, we can see, the gist of Justice Khanna's conception of "ordered
community," now brought within the terms of the constitution itself.
Maneka Gandhi, obviously, was revolutionary-and its revolution took
hold. The case marked the beginning of the great period of rights
jurisprudence in Indian constitutional law. 173
Notwithstanding his impressively cosmopolitan invocation of examples
drawn from the experience of other nations that have drafted explicit
provisions for the declaration of states of emergency, Professor Ackerman
does not discuss states of emergency in the constitutional law of India. But
the constitutional treatment of states of emergency, and the implementing
framework statutes as well, are subjects of intricate analysis within Indian
law worth careful study. For present purposes, the example of India is
important mostly for what it suggests about judicial reassessment of crisis
action. As Ackerman might have predicted, in the initial period of crisis, the
Supreme Court of India gave way, acceded to government arguments, and
indeed arguably even deepened the public sense of crisis. But Khanna's
dissent, amplifying ideas not much different from those we have already
noted in Atkin's dissent in Liversidge and Douglas's muted Endo opinion,
provided a template in the succeeding period. 174
In that next phase, remodeled constitutional law elaborated explosively.
To be sure, within the emergency itself, only Justice Khanna was prepared
to act critically and to bring to bear conceptions of constitutional law apt to
172. Id. at 606 (Beg, C.J., concurring).
173. See M.P. Jain, The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: ITS GRASP AND REACH 1, 23-37 (S.K. Verma & Kusum eds., 2000).
The subheadings in this part of Jain's article tell much of the story--"Humanization of Criminal
Justice," "Quality of Life," "Right to Livelihood," "Right to Education," "Sexual Harassment,"
"Ecology." It is as though Frank Michelman had been reincarnated in the pages of the All India
Reporter.
174. See T.R. Andhyarujina, The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme Court, in
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE, supra note 169, at 193, 203; Jain, supra note 173, at 23 ("The
judicial attitude... underwent a metamorphosis after the traumatic experiences under the internal
emergency imposed in 1975 which was lifted in 1977.").
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the moment. The Supreme Court on which he sat did not itself end the
emergency. But Khanna's criticism was apt. It seems to have provided a
point of departure for constitutional adjudication to reformulate itself, and
extend its agenda.
The example of India is thus provocative but only almost apposite. The
Supreme Court of India, itself initially caught up in the crisis atmosphere,
quickly and dramatically repudiated its first reaction, and in the process
institutionalized that repudiation within the substance of constitutional law.
We noted earlier our regret that Professor Ackerman, despite his doubts
about the value of the judicial process as compared with the legislative
process in containing the excesses of government reaction to terrorist-
induced emergencies, has not paid more attention to the role that the
judicial process has played in helping to establish the primacy of
legislatures in structuring reactions to wartime emergency in the United
States. The example of India, though, poses another question: Are there
instances in which courts, acting within periods of emergency, have proven
themselves to be capable-without the strongly mediating role of
framework legislation-of developing modes of criticism and reassessment
with some generalizable utility? The most instructive example we have
found, remarkably, lies close at hand, within American constitutional law
itself.175
B. Cold War Structures of Rights
Without making much of the fact, Professor Ackerman sets his
enterprise within a period in time that postdates not only September 11,
2001, but also 1989, the year we treat as marking the end of the Cold War.
The Cold War era is notable for present purposes because it too was a time
in which the suspicion was prevalent-if waxing and waning-that the
population of the United States included persons and "cells" more or less at
war with the United States government, or in any case willing to aid or act
in the interests of a ruthless and formidable adversary. It was also another
time in which the United States government, joined by state governments,
attempted in various ways to test that suspicion and to defend against
perceived risks. We remember these efforts as contrb.v~rsial (to say the
least). The House Committee on Un-American ActiVities (HUAC), the
blacklists, the rise and fall of Senator McCarthy, the investigation and
conviction of Alger Hiss, the trial and execution of Ethel and Julius
175. We agree with Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule that neither rights-
limitations nor rights-vindications are necessary features of states of emergency. See Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 40, at 625-26. We would emphasize, perhaps more than they do, a
corollary: Absent necessity, the question of rights becomes, at least in part, a question of effort, of
imagination, of articulation. This is, especially, the underlying theme of the next Section.
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Rosenberg-these and other episodes associated with the era continue to
resonate in public memory, sometimes still in sharply divisive ways.
Ackerman notes that Cold War security efforts for the most part put to
work the usual mechanisms of the criminal law. He believes that these
mechanisms are not altogether apposite in the present circumstances-
indeed, that neither the model of crime nor the model of war neatly fits our
"struggle" against international terrorism.176 Prevention must be the
watchword, threats of punishment cannot be expected to deter adversaries
who are willing and sometimes eager to die for their cause, and the normal
structures of warfare against enemy nation-states with organized military
machines are largely if not entirely irrelevant. But the Cold War, of course,
was also not a "war" fought chiefly in the usual way. And within the Cold
War context the uses made of criminal prosecutions, administrative
procedures, and legislative investigations were certainly not "ordinary
course of business." The Cold War does differ from our current situation, as
Ackerman understands it, in at least one important respect: The
confrontation with the Soviet Union was conceived, by and large, as a long-
term, continuing contest, an ongoing crisis, and not a series of separated
incidents. We have suggested, criticizing Professor Ackerman, that the
present moment might also be perceived as an extended, persistent
confrontation. Thus, from our perspective, the Cold War looks more
pertinent.
In particular, we think, the Cold War work of the Supreme Court is
very much worth recalling as we reflect on what ordinary constitutional law
has to contribute today. The many efforts of the Court-across some two
decades-to come to grips with, limit, and ultimately largely dismantle
Cold War security efforts do not figure at all in The Emergency
Constitution. This is perhaps not surprising in an account that associates
judicial process with "common law fog" and "legalisms." To be sure, the
Cold War Court's effort was not a straightforward civil liberties success
story. Domestic security arguments prevailed often-indeed, throughout
most of the period.' 77 Early cases in particular reveal the Supreme Court in
dramatic disarray. 78 Professor Ackerman might plausibly argue that there
176. We use the word "struggle" and not, say, "battle," because we agree with Professor
Ackerman-and other commentators like Professor Heymann-that much more is to be lost than
gained by describing the current struggle as a "war on terrorism." See HEYMANN, supra note 45,
at 19-33.
177. We do not think, as Professor Ackerman seems to, that the Cold War cases can be
divided into two groups-McCarthy-era and afterwards. See Ackerman, supra note 12, at
1896 & n.69. The patterns of results, and divisions within the Supreme Court, were too
complicated and too long-lasting, as we will see, to fit this model. Our discussion will also not fit
easily, for the same reason, within the well-known picture of "two" Warren Courts.
178. Compare, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951),
with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In the first of these cases, the profoundly
fragmented Supreme Court ruled, however obscurely, against a government effort to stop an
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is evidence here not only of "fog," but of confusion close to panic."'
Decisions throughout the period frequently revealed close divisions, and the
changing roster of Justices plainly mattered; it certainly appears as though
congressional and popular hostility sometimes also had effects.'
80
Nonetheless, we are able to glimpse, in the organization and themes of
many opinions, the emergence and elaboration of distinctive "rights
structures," complex compounds within whose interplaying terms opposed
constitutional imperatives might be acknowledged without collapsing into
obvious contradiction. We describe in some detail the work of the Cold
War Supreme Court. We do so not to extract conclusions of substance
concerning constitutional law. Instead, we mean to make a show of
possibility-to depict judicial work illustrative of the capacity of ordinary
constitutional law to come to grips with-to judge-claims of individual
rights in emergency settings.181 All of this work, whatever the limits of its
accomplishment, was no mean feat. Why suppose that something
equivalent is not possible now? The "garrison state" that Cold War
Americans feared the United States would become, and the relentless
"emergency state" that concerns us now, may not be substantially dissimilar
dystopic worries. 182 We might want to learn from the past in order to repeat
(at least part of) it.
It was evident early on that the Cold War was a contest playing out on
several levels. Threats of nuclear annihilation and intensely fought,
sometimes long-lasting localized military conflicts proceeded in parallel
with each other and also with what was understood, seemingly by many on
both sides, to be an extended cultural tournament. Nikita Khrushchev's
administrative blacklisting effort; in the second, almost as divided, the Court upheld (even as it
bitterly debated) Smith Act prosecutions.
179. William Wiecek writes:
Beset by the same anxieties that gripped other Americans at the time, most of the
Justices of the Vinson Court acknowledged anticommunism as a legitimate expression
of democratic politics.... Stampeded by the frightening sequence of international
setbacks to American foreign policy from 1946 through 1950, facing a genuinely brutal
and repressive totalitarian regime in a world increasingly bipolar and dangerous.... the
Justices gave free rein to executive, legislative, and popular determination to destroy
the domestic arm of the international Communist movement.
William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of
Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REv. 375, 433-34.
180. Political dynamics are discussed in considerable and sobering detail in LUCAS A. POWE,
JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 75-102, 135-56, 491 (2000). Professor Powe
provocatively stresses the overlap and interaction of civil rights cases and domestic security cases,
arguing that it was the civil rights commitments of the Supreme Court that ultimately broke what
he sees as a domestic security stalemate. We adopt a narrower focus here.
181. For a helpful, if perhaps too cheerful overview, giving less emphasis overall to the
decisions upholding domestic security concerns, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT
AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 52-73 (1998) (chapter titled "Standing Up to McCarthyism").
182. On the "garrison state" worry in the early Cold War period, see AARON L. FRIEDBERG,
IN THE SHADOW OF THE GARRISON STATE 53-58 (2000). For the initial elaboration of the idea,
see Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. Soc. 455 (1941).
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declaration-"We will bury you"-is the most famous of the Soviet bugle
calls proclaiming the social, economic, and political race. The American
equivalent, published in 1947, appears near the end of the immediately
classic essay that George Kennan wrote for Foreign Affairs:
Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this
country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence
a test of the over-all worth of the United States as a nation among
nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure
up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation
as a great nation.
Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than
this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of
Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the
Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience
a certain gratitude to Providence which, by providing the American
people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire
security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together
and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership
that history plainly intended them to bear.'
83
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in United States v. Robel,
one of the last of the security cases, echoed Kennan's challenge:
Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending
those values and ideals which set this Nation apart. For almost two
centuries, our country has taken singular pride in the democratic
ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most cherished of those
183. "X," The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566, 582 (1947). NSC 68,
sometimes thought to be the equivalent of the Constitution for purposes of initial Cold War
policymaking, reformulated Kennan's observations in more aggressive terms:
The vast majority of Americans are confident that the system of values which animates
our society-the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual, and
the supremacy of reason over will-are valid and more vital than the ideology which is
the fuel of Soviet dynamism. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other
peoples-our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who
now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement, and
insecurity.
... The potential within us of bearing witness to the values by which we live
holds promise for a dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality of our
system. The essential tolerance of our world outlook, our generous and constructive
impulses, and the absence of covetousness in our international relations are assets of
potentially enormous influence.
NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (Apr. 14, 1950), in
AMERICAN COLD WAR STRATEGY: INTERPRETING NSC 68, at 23, 42 (Ernest R. May ed., 1993).
On Kennan's disagreements with NSC 68, see WILSON D. MISCAMBLE, GEORGE F. KENNAN AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1947-1950, at 309-13 (1992).
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ideals have found expression in the First Amendment. It would
indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would
sanction the subversion of one of those liberties-the freedom of
association-which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.'1 84
The point-a point as worth making now as in 1947 or 1967-was in
fact made over and over throughout the period, especially in dissenting and
concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas. 185 Black's conclusion to
his opinion in Yates v. United States is characteristic:
Doubtlessly, dictators have to stamp out causes and beliefs which
they deem subversive to their evil regimes. But governmental
suppression of causes and beliefs seems to me to be the very
antithesis of what our Constitution stands for. The choice expressed
in the First Amendment in favor of free expression was made
against a turbulent background by men such as Jefferson, Madison,
and Mason-men who believed that loyalty to the provisions of this
Amendment was the best way to assure a long life for this new
nation and its Government.... The First Amendment provides the
only kind of security system that can preserve a free government-
one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss,
advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and
antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.
186
Freedom of speech, of course, was not the only constitutional right that
appeared to be salient in domestic security cases187 and that distinguished
our polity from that of the nations we were combating. But Justice Black's
free speech opinions were (and still are) especially notable. Invoking ideas
of freedom of speech in sufficiently abstract terms, Black was able to posit
insistent equations of present and past, with an attendant parade of heroes
and villains, as well as similarly pressing equations of security concerns and
practices in the United States and unnerving governmental procedures
elsewhere-say, in the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. The forcefulness of
these comparisons worked, in turn, to burnish the plausibility of Black's
so-called textualism, his asserted commitment to enforcing constitutional
language as directly as possible ("Congress shall make no law. .. ."). The
relatively abstract terms used in the Constitution, Black had already shown
184. 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (Warren, C.J.).
185. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 77-79 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
186. 354 U.S. 298, 343-44 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (Bill of Attainder Clause);
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (privilege against self-incrimination); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956) (Supremacy Clause); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (substantive
due process).
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his readers, were altogether appropriate for judicial use, plainly able to
express and explain strong conclusions and strong feelings.
There was this difficulty, however: Concern for domestic security could
also be framed in general, emphatic terms, pointing to conclusions pretty
much opposite those reached by Justice Black. In Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, for example, Justice Jackson wrote for a majority of the Court
to uphold a federal statute authorizing deportation of an otherwise legally
resident alien who was (or had been) a member of the Communist Party."8
The statute, Jackson concluded, was consistent with due process:
This Act was approved by President Roosevelt... when a world
war was threatening to involve us, as soon it did. Communists in
the United Stat's were exerting every effort to defeat and delay our
preparations. Certainly no responsible American would say that
there were then or are now no possible grounds on which Congress
might believe that Communists in our midst are inimical to our
security.... It would be easy for those of us who do not have
security responsibility to say that those who do are taking
Communism too seriously and overestimating its danger.... We,
in our private opinions, need not concur in Congress' policies to
hold its enactments constitutional. Judicially we must tolerate what
personally we may regard as a legislative mistake.... We think
that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and
irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or qualify
the Government's power of deportation.1 89
It was possible, against this backdrop, to depict opinions limiting
constitutional rights as therefore antitotalitarian, indeed altogether
Kennanesque. Harisiades is again illustrative. Addressing a free speech
claim, Justice Jackson wrote:
True, it often is difficult to determine whether ambiguous speech is
advocacy of political methods or subtly shades into a methodical
but prudent incitement to violence. Communist governments avoid
the inquiry by suppressing everything distasteful. Some would have
us avoid the difficulty by going to the opposite extreme of
permitting incitement to violent overthrow at least unless it seems
certain to succeed immediately. We apprehend that the Constitution
188. 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (Jackson, J.).
189. Id. at 590-91. John Lewis Gaddis has noted a similar dynamic in the argument of NSC
68: "The document paid obeisance to the balance of power, diversity, and freedom, but nowhere
did it set out the minimum requirements necessary to secure those interests. Instead it found in the
simple presence of a Soviet threat sufficient cause to deem the interest threatened vital." John
Lewis Gaddis, Gaddis's Commentary, in AMERICAN COLD WAR STRATEGY: INTERPRETING NSC
68, supra note 183, at 141, 145.
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enjoins upon us the duty, however difficult, of distinguishing
between the two. 190
We can glimpse, in these Black and Jackson passages, important
elements of what would often appear to be a fundamental division within
the Cold War Supreme Court. On one view, the question in the domestic
security cases concerned, simply and exclusively, the pertinence of
constitutional rights. If applicable, these rights ruled. Their usual
(constitutionally framed) terms by themselves determined the outcomes of
individual cases. The second view held that security concerns were also
relevant and worthy of deference. It was therefore necessary to draw
distinctions, to accommodate somehow both constitutional rights and
security concerns. In principle, at least, there was no necessary hierarchy
ordering the competing considerations. Interests, it was often said, needed
to be balanced.
Neither of these competing modes of analysis and justification
succeeded in entirely marginalizing the other. Justices Black and Douglas,
prominently on the one side, and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, equally
visibly aligned on the other, persisted in their views, seizing whatever
opportunities the cases presented, repeatedly asserting the merits of their
own approaches, and criticizing--often trenchantly-the opposing
perspective. 191 Importantly, however, this methodological conflict, although
it appears to have ratcheted up the degree of adjudicative difficulty in the
domestic security cases generally, figured mainly as a sort of tense
backdrop. Justices, including direct participants in the dispute, were often
able to assemble subsuming accounts integrating enough elements of the
opposed approaches to enable the Court to reach and justify decisions.
The most successful of these opinions employ forms of argument that
look like nothing so much as several constitutional law equivalents of
matryoshki-Russian nesting dolls. This analogy is not just ironic. Within
the sequences of "insets" (dolls within dolls, as it were) that organize the
arguments of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan and Brennan in
particular, points of view attributed to and thus depicting both official
actors and individuals caught up in official security efforts figure
prominently. The Justices disagree about how these points of view should
be described: Should viewpoints be described in terms linked with and
190. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592 (Jackson, J.).
191. For criticism, see, for example, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961)(Harlan, J.); and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-45 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Jackson famously resists categorization in either camp, perhaps because his tenure on the
Court was punctuated by his service as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg. See WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 179-81 (new ed. 2001); see also Patrick Schmidt, "The
Dilemma to a Free People": Justice Robert Jackson, Walter Bagehot, and the Creation of a
Conservative Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 517 (2002).
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derived from government domestic security concerns-in the language and
from the perspective of state necessity and national interest? Or should
viewpoints be represented in terms derived from the constitutional
protections to which individuals are entitled-in terms, that is, of
constitutional rights? Justices also disagree about which constitutional
rights matter most in which settings, and thus about the specificity and
presuppositions of individual viewpoints in particular. 1
92
The ongoing controversy in the Supreme Court is thus driven by, and
makes palpable, an underlying competition among differing visions of the
world as seen from the vantage point of the individuals and government
officials who populate it. These visions encode the world as an array of
interests properly represented by government, as a pattern of rights
belonging to individual persons, or as presenting itself afresh to individuals
who are understood as standing outside both the map of interests and the
map of rights. The clash among those visions in turn reflects a competition
among differing conceptions of individuals-as objects of governmental
concern, as subjects of constitutional protection, or as inset within neither
governmental nor constitutional agendas but instead as exterior to (prior to)
both. It is principally the structure and play of this competition that-we
think-we ought to recall now.
First matryoshka: In Watkins v. United States, a contempt prosecution
originating in the refusal of a witness to answer questions posed by a
subcommittee of HUAC, Chief Justice Warren concluded that the serious
concerns that might lie behind committee member questions did not,
standing alone, require witnesses to cooperate. 93 Rather, in view of equally
serious concerns for individual rights, the challenged questions needed
specific grounding in the subcommittee charter that had been granted by the
full committee; this grant in turn needed grounding in a sufficiently detailed
congressional delegation. "Protected freedoms should not be placed in
danger in the absence of a clear determination by the House or the Senate
that a particular inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need."1
94
Warren proceeded similarly in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, addressing a
state legislative investigation delegated to the state attorney general:
The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the
information the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner
must be treated as the absence of authority. It follows that the use
192. There are, of course, also disagreements about the content of any given right, but that
level of disagreement is transparent; about it, there is little one can say other than to rehearse the
debate itself.
193. 354 U.S. 178, 214-16 (1957) (Warren, C.J.).
194. Id. at 205. Only one Justice dissented in Watkins. See id. at 217 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter wrote a brief concurring opinion. See id. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Two Justices did not sit.
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of the contempt power, notwithstanding the interference with
constitutional rights, was not in accordance with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.195
Warren's requirement of "indications" or "clear determination" was, we can
see, a demand that the investigative agenda itself acknowledge the
importance of constitutional rights of individuals, a demand that legislative
action within its own terms display constitutional concerns-in its tight
focus, in the concreteness of its preoccupations, reveal, however obliquely,
the impress or "shape" of constitutional requirements.
Yates v. United States,196 issued on the same "Red Monday," 197 showed
Justice Harlan engaged in a similar exercise in the course of reviewing the
convictions of fourteen members of the Communist Party for political
organizing and advocacy in violation of the Smith Act. Harlan inset free
speech rights within the Smith Act, as it were, reading the statute, with
notable creativity, as acknowledging differences in forms of "advocacy"
that the Supreme Court had already recognized as constitutionally
significant as of the date of the Act's passage in 1940.198 The Smith Act
was thus read as satisfying the requirement that the legislative
investigations at issue in Watkins and Sweezy had failed to meet. Justice
Harlan insisted that the constitutional impress be apparent within seemingly
secondary instruments as well: The jury instructions in Yates were flawed
because they did not stress differences in advocacies enough to fit within
the parameters of the compound constitutional and statutory scheme.1 99
Harlan ultimately parsed the trial record, identifying which Communist
Party defendants, given proper instructions, might be retried and which
were plainly entitled to acquittal. 0
Second matryoshka: The approaches of Justice Harlan and Chief Justice
Warren also differed in an important way. Thoughtful discussions of free
speech and due process concerns in Watkins and Sweezy provided
justifications for the requirement that legislative committee questions
plainly fall within the scope of prior legislative determinations of pertinent
matters of concern. But the problems of self-censorship and fair notice that
Chief Justice Warren identified suggested little about what the precise
content of legislative agendas ought to be. Warren's requirement was in
195. 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957) (Warren, C.J.) (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Warren
wrote for four Justices. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred, balancing interests at length.
See id. at 255-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). Two Justices dissented. See id. at
267-70 (Clark, J., dissenting). One Justice did not sit.
196. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
197. On the origin of the phrase and its ramifications, see POWE, supra note 180, at 93-103.
198. 354 U.S. at 324-25 (Harlan, J.).
199. Id. at 320.
200. Id. at 327-34.
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substance entirely formal-insisted that the investigative scope be "precise"
and "specific." In Yates, however, Justice Harlan drew from constitutional
law and attributed to statutory language what he understood to be a richly
substantive distinction, between "advocacy of abstract doctrine and
advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action., 201 It was this distinction
that the trial court failed to acknowledge and elaborate sufficiently clearly
and that Harlan put to work himself in declaring whether individual
defendants were to be acquitted or might be retried. He took a similar
approach in the succeeding Smith Act decisions in Scales v. United
States20 2 and Noto v. United States.20 3 In these latter cases the issue was
criminal membership, and Justice Harlan, very much as he had in Yates,
identified within statutory terms constitutional requirements, tracing to
rights of freedom of association and due process, that membership in an
organization engaged in illegal activity must be knowing, active, and
specifically intended to advance the illegal activity. Evidence at trial
showed that the Communist Party participation of the Scales defendants
met these tests-but the evidence concerning the Noto defendants showed
otherwise.
In all three opinions, Justice Harlan depicted constitutional rights as
inset in statutory language, but at the same time characterized the content of
those rights in terms that precisely identified the proper focus of legislative
domestic security concerns, and thus inset statutory preoccupations within
constitutional specifications. "Advocacy of action," "knowing, active
membership," "specific intention to further illegal aims"-these criteria
worked much like a photographic negative to picture in reverse, as it were,
constitutionally protected speech or association; at the same time, they
directly disclosed actual security threats. Importantly, descriptions of
constitutional rights that took this form personified rights, indeed
personified them in a particular way-gave content to otherwise abstractly
defined rights (or explained the inapplicability of such rights) by invoking
images of acting individuals and, in particular, of individuals motivated and
acting in troubling ways. Harlan's terms in the first instance supplied
criteria for picking out individuals whose purposes and acts did not warrant
constitutional protections-and thus indirectly identified individuals who
might properly claim constitutional rights.
In other cases, Justice Harlan put several versions of this approach to
use. In Barenblatt v. United States,2°4 he dramatically gutted Watkins (if
only for purposes of Barenblatt itself-Watkins continued to be invoked in
201. Id. at 318.
202. 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (Harlan, J.).
203. 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (Harlan, J.).
204. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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other Supreme Court decisions 205). Harlan declared at the outset that "[the
congressional power of inquiry] and the right of resistance to it are to be
judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions. 2 °6 In application,
this approach largely took the form of a close look at committee work from
a perspective attributed to the individual charged with contempt for not
answering committee questions. Sometimes this focus was implicit.
Because HUAC throughout its history had engaged in an
"unremitting" investigation of committee activities, 20 7 this generalized
agenda could not be truly regarded as unconstitutionally vague (i.e., should
not have surprised the witness). Watkins worries were therefore irrelevant.
In other instances, Harlan was explicit: The memorandum that the witness
submitted to the subcommittee in order to explain his refusal did not in so
many words object to particular questions, and the fact that the
memorandum was "prepared" in advance showed that the witness was
"well aware of the Subcommittee's authority and purpose to question him
as it did., 20 ' The witness's Watkins argument was in effect estopped-the
pertinence worry was again irrelevant. Individual conduct, as in the Smith
Act cases, was judged closely, once more ultimately from the perspective of
government concerns-albeit, in Barenblatt, now concerns about
witnesses' legal maneuvering and not subversive advocacy, concerns thus
more procedural than substantive. 0 9
In re Anastaplo 210 and Konigsberg v. State Bar211 concerned character
qualifications for admission to the state bar. Justice Harlan treated
administrative procedure as both the context within which individual acts
were to be judged and as itself the government preoccupation fixing the
standard for judging individual acts. He described the concern of bar
officials as an altogether general interest in resolving doubt about character,
pertinent in all cases whether or not statements or associations of individual
applicants provided reason for specific concern. His opinions in these cases
thus were of a piece with Barenblatt. The refusal of applicants to answer
,205. For decisions in which Watkins retained force, see, for example, Gojack v. United States,
384 U.S. 702 (1966); DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); and Deutch v. United
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
206. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 112 (Harlan, J.).
207. Id. at 119-20.
208. Id. at 124; see also id. at 123-25 (identifying other aspects of Barenblatt's conduct as a
witness).
209. The famous interest-balancing exercise in Barenblatt occurs only after Justice Harlan
has disposed of Watkins, and thus only after the most pressing issue in the case has been resolved.
The balancing, perhaps not surprisingly in this context, is actually rather perfunctory, framing
governmental concerns as a "long and widely accepted view," id. at 128, without closely
examining that view, and dismissing closer scrutiny as resting on an entirely opposed perspective,
see id. at 128-29. There is no real discussion of contrary individual interests. See id. at 134. For a
largely similar approach, see Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 77-81 (1959).
210. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
211. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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questions was made to appear as nothing more than noncooperation, in
itself both a procedural problem and substantively troubling in the context
of administrative character inquiries. Noncooperation, seen in this light,
also appeared to be a politically neutral matter, and thus administrative
action could be depicted as falling outside the scope of free speech
concerns.212
Third matryoshka: In Watkins, Chief Justice Warren described the free
speech problem of self-censorship in quite context-specific terms.
Discretion is the better part of valor: The virtue of cautious exercise of
rights of free speech and freedom of association was the lesson taught by
legislative committee "show trials" themselves and, even more importantly,
by public hostility to witnesses appearing before the committees. 213 Warren
also represented the due process difficulties he noted as another artifact of
the committee setting, as originating in the quandary of individuals needing
(but unable) to determine the pertinence of questions.21 4 In his opinion for
the Supreme Court in Speiser v. Randall, Justice Brennan radically
rearranged and restated the Watkins concerns.215 In the process, Brennan
developed a mode of argument that reversed Justice Harlan's emphases.
California property tax assessors had denied exemptions to otherwise
qualified veterans who had refused to sign a legislatively mandated loyalty
oath. The state constitution did not require the oath, but it did deny the tax
exemption to anyone who "advocate[d] the overthrow of the
Government... by force or violence or other unlawful means. 21 6 The
California Supreme Court had declared that the state constitutional loyalty
test reached only conduct that U.S. Supreme Court decisions held to fall
outside the scope of the First Amendment. Veterans who did not sign the
oath were obliged to appeal the assessors' decisions and prove that the
constitutional condition was not in fact applicable.
212. Justice Harlan had already adopted an approach much like this in a Fifth Amendment
case. See Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); see also Beilan v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S.
399 (1958) (concluding that refusal to answer was indicative of "incompetency").
213. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 222-23 (1957). Chief Justice Warren wrote:
The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, about
his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference. And
when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even
hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disastrous.
This effect is even more harsh when it is past beliefs, expressions or associations that
are disclosed and judged by current standards rather than those contemporary with the
matters exposed.... Those who are identified by witnesses and thereby placed in the
same glare of publicity are equally subject to public stigma, scorn and obloquy. Beyond
that, there is the more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to
the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a
similar fate at some future time.
Id. at 197-98.
214. See id. at 208-15.
215. 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (Brennan, J.).
216. Id. at 516 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 19 (1952)).
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The state, Justice Brennan wrote, had put in place "a short-cut
procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected speech.
2 1 7
The problem was the allocation of the burden of proof. "[D]ue process
demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward
with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition."'21 8 The fact that the California
loyalty test, in substance, satisfied the First Amendment was not
dispositive:
The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech
falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the
possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent in all litigation-will
create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized.
The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade
another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far
wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these
burdens. This is especially to be feared when the complexity of the
proofs and the generality of the standards applied provide but
shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain his position.
How can a claimant whose declaration is rejected possibly sustain
the burden of proving the negative of these complex factual
elements? In practical operation, therefore, this procedural device
must necessarily produce a result that the State could not command
directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech that the
Constitution makes free.2 19
Matryoshka, matryoshka, matryoshka: Within this brief passage, we
can see, Justice Brennan inset free speech concerns within due process
analysis and also proceeded precisely oppositely. Brennan acknowledged
that California had confined its loyalty test within First Amendment terms,
but nonetheless showed that, within the due process perspective, the
pertinence of First Amendment notions (as formulated by the United States
Supreme Court! 220) made matters worse because of the "complexity" and
"generality" of free speech tests. The uncertainty and the corresponding
incentive to steer clear of certain statements or associations attributable to
the allocation of the burden of proof was a due process problem and not
simply a commonplace "inherent in all litigation," because of the free
speech concems-"deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes
free.",22' This troubling "deterrence" was made apparent, however, because
of the shift from the free speech to the due process perspective. The
217. Id. at 529.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
220. Justice Brennan referred specifically to Dennis v. United States, as Justice Harlan had
somewhat similarly in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320-21 (1957).
221. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526.
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individual deterred was not caught up within the swirl of questions,
statements, and public opinion that Chief Justice Warren had described so
powerfully in Watkins-rather, the individual was positioned within the
ordinary context of litigation, engaged in an utterly ordinary lawyerly
analysis of risks. 22
Association of individuals with the lawyerly perspective223 is also
evident in Justice Stewart's opinion in Cramp v. Board of Public
Instruction, decided on due process vagueness grounds, in which Stewart
picked apart the language of a Florida teacher's oath with a paragraph of
machine gun questioning reminiscent of first-year law school.224 Justice
White adopted the same approach, now as a matter of free speech analysis,
in Baggett v. Bullitt, another teacher's oath case.225 Justice Brennan
subsequently invoked Baggett, and also Speiser, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,
striking down provisions of a Louisiana subversive activities control law
enforced through criminal prosecutions rather than oaths:
[W]e see no controlling distinction in the fact that the definition is
used to provide a standard of criminality rather than the contents of
a test oath. This overly broad statute also creates a "danger zone"
within which protected expression may be inhibited. Cf. Speiser v.
Randall. So long as the statute remains available to the State the
threat of prosecutions of protected expression is a real and
substantial one. Even the prospect of ultimate failure of such
prosecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect on protected
expression.226
Dombrowski, standing alone, is famously controversial. This is in part
because later critics were, not surprisingly, inclined to read Dombrowski in
222. Dissenting a year later in Uphaus v. Wyman, Justice Brennan again situated his analysis
within the legal procedural context, this time to discredit an investigation undertaken by the New
Hampshire attorney general. "The citation of names in the book does not appear to have any
relation to the possibility of an orthodox or traditional criminal prosecution, and the Attorney
General seems to acknowledge this." 360 U.S. 72, 95 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 88-96.
223. It was an association that Justice Brennan was to develop into a veritable art form of its
own in his imagined dialogue between the black defendant, on trial for his life on a charge of
having murdered a white victim, and the defendant's attorney, trying to answer his client's
question "whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die" and feeling "bound to tell [his client]
that defendants charged with killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be
sentenced to death as defendants charged with killing blacks," and that, "more likely than
not.., the race of [his] victim would determine whether he received a death sentence."
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224. See 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961) (Stewart, J.). Justice Stewart also viewed the oath from the
perspective of a hypothetical perjury prosecution. See id. at 286-87.
225. 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (White, J.); see also Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 58-62 (1967)
(overlapping vagueness and free speech analyses); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
226. 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Brennan, J.) (citation omitted).
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light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Younger v. Harris,227
and thus to look closely at the parts of the Brennan opinion intertwining
equitable and federalism dictates (the parts of the opinion that we do not
discuss here), disconnecting these parts from the discussion of the
unconstitutionality of the Louisiana law challenged in the case.228 In the
constitutional analysis as such, though, Brennan also appeared to assume,
troublingly without any real explanation, that statutory language standing
alone-the "law in books" by itself-was the key, without much in the way
of regard for the precise way in which statutory terms influenced individual
conduct-the law in action. It would seem to be one thing to suppose that
an individual required to swear an oath would examine closely and
skeptically the terms of that oath. But do individuals really proceed
similarly in considering the language of statutes that officials might bring to
bear to constrain individual action?
229
Keyishian v. Board of Regents returned to this last question. 230 There,
citing both Cramp and Baggett, Justice Brennan first held that an elaborate
New York teacher-loyalty program was unconstitutionally vague, even
though New York had eliminated any resort to oaths. "Vagueness of
wording is aggravated by prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations,
and administrative machinery, and by manifold cross-references to
interrelated enactments and rules.",231 He then invalidated a separate state
prohibition of Communist Party membership. This prohibition was utterly
clear in its coverage of any and all forms of Party membership, without
regard to knowledge, activity, or specific intent. But it was, Brennan
concluded, just as invalid as a vague statute. "Where statutes have an
overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague, 'the hazard of loss or
substantial impairment of... rights may be critical,' since those covered by
the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably
227. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
228. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
229. Well-known discussions of what came to be known as the overbreadth doctrine address
ramifications of this difficulty with considerable depth and subtlety. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,
83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). Notwithstanding the complexities of the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine, judicial scrutiny of statutes on their face of course remains an important
element within constitutional adjudication generally. See Monaghan, supra. One example can be
found in contexts in which the "law in books," even if virtually never directly enforced, may serve
to excuse hostile treatment of individuals thought to be singled out for social condemnation by the
terms of that law-a phenomenon famously identified in, and made the jurisprudential centerpiece
of, the Supreme Court's invalidation of laws banning sodomy among consenting adults in private,
which the Court understood had become synonymous with gay-bashing. See Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). For extended discussion, see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:
The 'Fundamental Right' That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).
230. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
231. Id. at 604.
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safe. '232 "[T]hose covered.., are bound"-this is, we recognize, the ex
ante perspective of the careful, lawyerly reader, and of Holmes's famous
"bad man." It is also the perspective that Speiser built up through its
reciprocal insets of free speech and due process (Brennan's citation to
Speiser in Dombrowski was no doubt meant to suggest this association). It
is the individual thus conceived who will respond as Brennan supposes.
This perspective achieves its apotheosis, arguably, in United States v.
Robel.233 Addressing loyalty requirements conditioning employment in
defense industries, Chief Justice Warren, writing for a majority, proceeded
much as he had in Watkins (and as Justice Harlan had in Yates),
emphasizing the failure of the regulatory scheme suitably to acknowledge
within its own terms vital First Amendment concerns. Justice Brennan
concurred-but wrote an extended opinion analyzing the federal statute at
issue from the perspective of the delegation doctrine. His opinion was a
virtuoso amalgamation of Watkins, administrative law, and fair notice
preoccupations.234 It took for granted that the perspective of constitutional
law here was the perspective of the risk-averse lawyerly reader-his readers
consider the regulatory scheme entirely within this gaze. The individual as
such seems to disappear-there is only the skepticism of the judicial reader.
But this is an illusion. The perspective of the individual is conceived as
itself lawyerly, as the same perspective as that of the judge (the judge
becomes the representative individual). It is this judicial skepticism,
therefore, that within Brennan's approach itself describes the content of the
individual right.
C. Ordered Controversy
Whatever it was that the Cold War Supreme Court accomplished, it was
achieved because some Justices sharply disagreed with regard to what they
thought were fundamentals. They persisted in this disagreement and
persisted in their intensity, their eloquence, and their criticisms of each
other. This was not cacophony. Justices committed to working within this
conflict recognized that they must identify means of ordering opposed
positions in ways that either suggested relative priorities in particular cases
or proposed superseding perspectives. No single such approach carried the
day. But the ongoing conflicts were subjected, because of this overlay of
intricacy, to the chance of variation, a kind of crucial indeterminacy. As a
result, there appeared within the cases a real prospect that individual rights
232. Id. at 609 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
233. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
234. See id. at 269-82 (Brennan, J., concurring). For Justice Brennan's remarkable McGautha
dissent, in which he elaborates many of these same themes, see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 248-312 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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would be acknowledged and protected (sometimes), and that government
concerns would be respected (sometimes). The deep structure of the
Constitution-implicit in the juxtaposition of the 1787 text and its first ten
Amendments, glossed in the Reconstruction recapitulation-revealed itself
again in the "inset" conceptions of the Cold War Supreme Court. Justices
improvised within, around, and over this structure, articulating increasingly
elaborate, subtle, and powerful arguments. There is a depth to their work, in
the end, that should command our respect. And it is a depth that could only
be achieved by grappling with emergencies and mortal threats, never by
bracketing them.
There is no reason now why judges and critics cannot learn from Black,
Douglas, Frankfurter, Harlan, Warren, and Brennan. We do not want to
claim too much. The Cold War Supreme Court did not always enforce
constitutional rights quickly; it deferred, at least sometimes, to government
domestic security concerns; the legal language it brought to. bear persisted
in a state of chronic controversy; its precedents plainly send a mixed
message. But that is only to say that the Cold War Supreme Court worked
with constitutional law in ways not so different from the ways-we learn
over and over-that Justices ordinarily do. There are no golden ages, only
ongoing argument and accumulating possibilities-and ordinarily, we think
that this is enough. If we are right in thinking this, it should be just as
possible now for constitutional law to undertake the work of complicating
crisis-putting opposed concerns to the work of renvoi, explicating. each
other. In the process, it should become possible to debate, from case to
case, the intricacies that thereby become apparent. This is the state of anti-
emergency. This is the state of constitutional law as we have it now.
This is an important and welcome conclusion. No less important is the
fact that the complete obliteration of the "ordinary" Constitution and its
temporary replacement by the Ackerman emergency constitution is
necessarily something of an optical illusion. The background persistence of
a constitution and of courts to enforce it-a background persistence that
Professor Ackerman also acknowledges-means that at some point, even if
the day of reckoning is delayed by the operation of the "emergency
constitution," those courts will end up being confronted with controversies
implicating the constitutionality of whatever framework statute put that
emergency constitution into effect. Perhaps more relevantly, they will also
be confronted with whatever steps were taken by the executive pursuant to
that emergency framework-steps that may have long-lingering
consequences that could easily remain "live" enough to support Article III
adjudication.
When such adjudication takes place, courts will be asked to make-and
may feel enormous pressure to make---exactly the same kinds of lasting
compromises in the background doctrines of the "ordinary" Constitution
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that Professor Ackerman fears trusting the current common law process will
require them to make. The only difference is that these new compromises
may be even more severe if, as Ackerman apparently contemplates, steps
driven by felt necessity end up being taken under the umbrella of the
emergency constitution when the "ordinary" Constitution would roundly
condemn them.
The "loaded weapon" that Justice Jackson feared-in the haunting,
Chekhovian image of his Korematsu dissent--cannot, it seems, be buried
forever in a world where the "Constitution for all seasons" remains alive,
even if dormant, and thus remains subject to reactivation when the
emergency and all of its time extensions have passed into history. Even if
precedents that speak from behind the veil of an emergency constitution
come to us inflected with a special caveat that seeks to confine them to "the
present circumstances '' 235 or to other circumstances equally exigent, the
effect any such caveat will properly have on future readers--on our own
future selves, among others-is impossible for anyone to determine ex ante:
Only future political and judicial actors can decide just how much and what
sort of weight to give any precedent, even one that seeks to contain its own
reach by proclaiming that it is rigged to self-destruct once certain barriers of
time or other circumstance have been surpassed.236
Put differently, there is simply no way, while under the sway of an
"emergency constitution," for us to position ourselves completely beyond
the outer perimeter of the anti-emergency Constitution so as to contain
within an "event horizon" (of the sort that physicists who study the cosmos
tell us surrounds any black hole and prevents light--or indeed information
of any kind-from leaking out into the surrounding space-time continuum
of the universe) the voices of precedent that are destined eventually to reach
us from within the zone of emergency. What we do while "under the
influence," as it were, will come back to haunt us one way or another.
Constitutional amnesia is unattainable.
Given the impossibility, therefore, of creating a dead zone within which
we may simply escape the boundaries of the anti-emergency Constitution
235. We recall, of course, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
236. Professor Ackerman worries that individual judges working with ordinary constitutional
law will, within emergency periods, make "catastrophic" decisions, releasing terrorists who go on
to launch the second strikes he especially fears. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1895-96. As we have
already observed, we are not as sure that the second strike model describes likely terrorist tactics
(at least tactics uninfluenced by Ackerman's own scheme). See supra text accompanying notes
42-44. It is also not necessary here to describe the host of constraints built into ordinary federal
judicial procedure--extraordinary writs and the like-to minimize the impact of off-the-wall
judging. We cannot claim (nor could Ackerman with respect to adjudication under his scheme)
that wrong decisions (tilting either in favor of individuals or against them) are impossible. We do
think that a body of law like constitutional law as we ordinarily understand it is a better bet insofar
as the question of mistake is an explicit topic, and part of the history (with famous or infamous
examples), of that law itself.
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under whose aegis we spend our ordinary lives and are always bound to do
so again, we might as well embrace that anti-emergency Constitution and
the rich framework within which we have operated for so long. It is within
this framework that we have articulated and argued for a succession of
tentative resolutions of competing values, ideals, and interests. It is within
this framework that we have found the terms to recognize and sometimes
repudiate our mistakes. This is all we need to address the dramatically
heightened time and space surrounding acts of terrorism like those of
September 11.
IV. THE METAPHOR OF THE BLACK HOLE
The metaphor of the black hole is increasingly used to sum up what
appears to be a characteristic feature of legal problems posed by a range of
government actions undertaken since September 11.237 But what precisely
are we picturing? It may be just a way of referring to something like sudden
blindness: Dealing with a particular problem, we see nothing with which to
work, nothing we can recognize, no solution. A black hole in this sense is
not an astrophysical phenomenon-it is literally a place beyond the light of
ordinary law into which, it seems, we have suddenly fallen. But the sense
that we are trapped within the blackness-and this does seem to be part of
237. Professor Ackerman thinks that elements of his scheme-in particular, its provision for
compensation for detained but innocent individuals-will have sufficient impact on our thinking
about constitutional law generally to make concerns about "black holes" inapposite, at least for
purposes of judging his effort. See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1885 & n.38. It is certainly the
case that adjusted versions of his proposal, at least, do introduce substantial fragments of ordinary
constitutional law and judicial review into the "emergency constitution." We have already noted
his one-step-removed borrowing of Eighth Amendment law in connection with elaboration of the
torture ban, and an apparently similar effort to incorporate usual equal protection analyses. See
supra note 90. His provision for punitive damages actions aimed at individual instances of "bad
faith" official acts, see Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1075, might be thought to establish another
overlap, and thus an opening for ordinary constitutional analyses. In connection with additions to
the framework statute during emergency periods, Ackerman would mandate "strict scrutiny" by
the Supreme Court. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1901 n.79.
Nonetheless, his central thought begins with the idea of "isolation"--or "quarantine" as he
makes clear in a revealing extended analogy. See id. at 1881-82. His compensation scheme is, it
appears, supposed to function like workers' compensation. Benefits will flow to detainees pretty
much automatically and immediately. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 1065-66 & n.88. Even if
this is practical, the compensation requirement will not provide occasions, on any regular basis,
for challenges to government reasons for acting, even narrowly specified. The punitive damages
actions, similarly, seem to focus on ad hoc transgressions of particular officials. The strict scrutiny
mandate, covering only the one contingency, is left unexplained: Is Ackerman referring to the
usual inquiries into reasons for government action shaped by sensitivity to individual rights at
stake, or risks to constitutional values posed? We think that the "normal form" of judicial
involvement, and thus recordmaking for the future, is the extraordinary minimalism we described
earlier. See supra note 85. If adjudication is nothing but pinpoint results, it verges on invisibility,
becomes no record for memory, might well be thought to describe something very much like a
black hole. We think that it is important to distinguish between inchoate reports and anecdotes
(these will not disappear during or after emergency periods) and densely organized analyses of the
sort that routinely accumulate in ordinary constitutional law.
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what it is that we mean to evoke--does catch something of the physicist's
idea of the event horizon, the idea that the gravity of the situation (as it
were) keeps us from seeing anything other than the crisis. If we add the
sense of intensification, of crushing concentration, we may get a good
analogy-a kind of jurisprudential equivalent-of the experience of panic:
We think about immediate circumstances continuously, continuously
coming up with nothing. Consciousness of gravity, of course, weighs down
the image. The idea of crushing panic, not necessarily inaccurate, does not
suggest much about what the right response is (the jurisprudential
equivalent of rolling up into a ball, maybe?). Stephen Hawking famously
characterizes black holes as sites of information loss, as reductions
in dimensionality. This formula, or something like it, may be easier to
work with.
Svetlana Alpers had this to say in an essay describing and discussing
Vermeer's painting The Art of Painting:
Like a surveyor, the painter is within the very world he represents.
He disappears into his task, depicting himself as an anonymous,
faceless figure, back turned to the viewer, his head topped by the
black hole of his hat at the center of a world saturated with color
and filled with light.238
The phrase "black hole... at the center of a world saturated with color and
filled with light" seems to approximate, in an elegant way, Stephen
Hawking's notion of information loss and dimension-collapse. The idea that
the black hole is the work of the artist obscuring as well as depicting the
artist at work is provocative. The painting might be understood to play a
game with its viewer: It is difficult not to look at the painter, who is right in
the middle of the painting, whose back is turned to the viewer, who is
dressed in black and white, whose hat really is just a black blob-but all
around the painter we see a tremendous amount of patterning and color set
within a kind of gold light. The effect is akin to a gestalt problem--
although here, the effect is achieved through astonishing virtuosity. To view
the painting, we realize, we need to train the eye not to keep coming back to
the painter.
Professor Ackerman precisely embraces information loss. Within his
states of emergency, there is no ordinary constitutional law, no
consideration of new justifications (or no justifications) for familiar rights.
Ackerman is untroubled by the darkness: He means, by working with
constitution noire, to commit his emergency constitution as little as possible
to accounts of the substance of what government can do or should not do
238. SVETLANA ALPERS, THE ART OF DESCRIBING: DUTCH ART IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY 168 (1983).
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during the emergency. We cannot know, we do not want to know, we will
not judge directly.
We propose-rather, Professor Ackerman provokes us-to try not to
approach matters this way. Alpers (or maybe Vermeer) prompts a simple
suggestion, really: Look around. Another way to reach something like this
conclusion, perhaps, supposes that we think about black holes not as sudden
physical manifestations-like holes in the ground-but as excavations or
deconstructions. We are (or at least we might be if we follow Ackerman)
the ones who-in response to the terrorist event-remove altogether what
was there before. This may be proper as a form of memorial. But for other
purposes, this might be altogether mistaken and profoundly premature. If
this is in some pertinent sense right-if it is we who would needlessly
construct the black hole, we who would be its designer, its painter, its
architect-then the truly urgent question is a very different one from any of
the questions Professor Ackerman's project impels him, even permits him,
to ask.
The urgent question for us becomes how to disrupt that process-not so
that we ignore the hole, not so that we fail to take the pragmatic steps that
need to be taken (clear away what makes us unbearably vulnerable to
recurring terrorist attacks), but in order that we might try to assure the
persistence of things past, to maintain the place of constitution blanche
alongside constitution noire. We should want to retain the ability to
recognize what we have not deleted, must not delete, from what Justice
Jackson famously imagined as our "constitutional constellation., 239 The
experience of permanent vulnerability may have put in doubt our belief that
there are "fixed stars" in the night sky. It will be our own doing if it erases
the dawn.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
239. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jackson, J.).
1870 [Vol. 113: 1801
